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ABSTRACT 
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL COGNITION, LANGUAGE, EXECUTIVE 
FUNCTIONS, AND THEORY OF MIND ABILITY IN HIGH-FUNCTIONING 
AUTISM 
 
By 
Meghan E. Wendelken 
August, 2013 
 
Thesis supervised by Diane L. Williams, PhD. CCC-SLP 
Whereas it is generally accepted that individuals with autism spectrum disorders 
(ASD)  have deficits in theory of mind, or the ability to understand that other people have 
thoughts and to infer or predict what those thoughts might be, the relationship of this 
deficit to other aspects of ASD is still debated. This study examined the relationship 
between measures of social cognition, language, and the specific executive functions of 
working memory and cognitive flexibility, and measures of ToM using a large sample of 
272 children and adults with high-functioning autism (HFA). The results of a series of 
hierarchical linear regression models indicated that the strongest relationship occurred 
between a general measure of language ability (Verbal IQ) and two different measures of 
ToM. In both children and adults with ASD, ToM abilities appear to be related to overall 
language abilities rather than a more generalized ability in social cognition or executive 
function. 
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Introduction 
Theory of mind (ToM), or the ability to understand that others have thoughts, 
desires, and intentions outside of one‘s own and to predict and explain behavior based on 
these mental states, is a cognitive skill that is thought to be essential for social interaction 
with others (Farrant, Mayberry, & Fletcher, 2012). It is classified as either being first 
order or second order. First order ToM is the ability to understand another individual‘s 
thoughts, whereas second order ToM requires understanding another person‘s thoughts 
about a third party‘s thoughts.  Understanding the various perspectives of the people one 
is interacting with is a vital skill that helps one to determine appropriate social 
communication and behavior. Therefore, a deficit in ToM is thought to be closely related 
to the social and communicative deficits associated with autism or autism spectrum 
disorders (ASD). The current study aims to investigate the question:  From where does 
the ToM deficit in ASD arise? 
False belief tasks are frequently used to assess ToM abilities in individuals with 
ASD. These tasks are called ―false belief‖ because they are assessing the ability to 
understand that a person will search for something in an incorrect location based on a 
false belief about the item‘s location. Children with ASD have been reported to be 
impaired on these tasks, and investigators have argued that this is the result of impaired 
executive functioning (Russell, Saltmarsh, & Hill, 1999) or impaired social cognition 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, Frith, 1985), both of which have been argued to be the central 
underlying deficit in ASD.  
ASD is a developmental disorder characterized by a triad of impairments 
including the lack of reciprocity in social interactions, difficulty with the communicative 
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use of language, and a restricted and repetitive repertoire of interests and behaviors 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) that is thought to be genetically or 
neurologically-based (Geschwind & Levitt, 2007). The social impairments associated 
with ASD include deficits in expression and comprehension of gestures, lack of eye 
contact, lack of both social and emotional reciprocity, limited facial expressions, and lack 
of desire to share interests or satisfaction with others. The ability to start and maintain a 
conversation is disordered even in verbal individuals with ASD, and spoken language is 
frequently used in a repetitive and echolalic manner. Another hallmark characteristic of 
the disorder includes atypical prosody. Speech may sound monotone and machine-like 
with a limited variety of intonation patterns. In addition, individuals with ASD have 
difficulty with understanding abstract concepts or abstract language as demonstrated by 
the absence of pretend play in young children with the disorder.  
Even though ASD is defined by this triad of symptoms, it is a spectrum disorder, 
and includes individuals with a wide range of communicative abilities. Individuals with 
ASD can range from completely non-verbal to being excessively verbal with a desire to 
socialize but with pragmatic ineptitude. Individuals with ASD may also exhibit a wide 
range of cognitive abilities as indicated by the variability in IQ scores within the disorder. 
Those who obtain an IQ of less than 70 are considered to have low-functioning autism, 
whereas those who obtain an IQ score of 70 or greater are considered to exhibit high-
functioning autism. In consideration of the spectrum nature of the disorder, the term ASD 
will be used throughout the remainder of this document to refer to both autism and autism 
spectrum disorders.  
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Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1985) are generally accepted as the first to promote 
the idea that ASD was the result of a ToM deficit.  They not only proposed that a deficit 
in ToM is a characteristic of individuals with ASD, but that it is the primary or core 
cognitive deficit underlying ASD. Furthermore, Baron-Cohen argued that the ToM deficit 
in ASD arises from a specific impairment in social cognition (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).   
Whereas a deficit in ToM is now generally accepted as characteristic of ASD, the 
nature or meaning of this deficit is still a matter of contention.  Some authors have argued 
that the ToM deficit can be explained by other models of ASD such as the executive 
dysfunction theory (Griffith, Pennington, Wehner, & Rogers, 1999; Ozonoff, Pennington, 
& Rogers, 1991; Robinson, Goddard, Dritschel, Wisley, & Howlin, 2009). In addition, 
because of the close relationship between ToM development and language development 
in typically developing children (Astington & Jenkins, 1996), the ToM deficit in ASD 
has also been argued to be associated with the difficulty children with ASD have with the 
development of language (Tager-Flusberg, 2007).  
Social Cognition and ToM 
ASD has been considered a specific disorder of the social cognitive domain due to 
the intact physicality and high intelligence observed in some individuals diagnosed with 
ASD (Fogeot d‘Arc & Mottron, 2012). Research results have consistently shown 
differences between groups with and without ASD on false-belief tasks requiring 
understanding of complex mental states, thereby demonstrating an atypical understanding 
of complex social situations within the high-functioning ASD population (Fogeot d‘Arc, 
& Mottron,  2012). Furthermore, this atypical performance is seen in the social areas of 
comprehension, perception, and motivation (Fogeot d‘Arc, & Mottron, 2012). 
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ToM is thought to be a skill that is part of the system of social cognition or the 
―social brain‖ (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Hadjikhani, Joseph, Snyder, & Tager-Flusberg, 
2006).  Manifestations of social cognition that begin to emerge in infancy, such as play, 
imitation, and joint attention, have been reported to be closely related to the development 
of ToM in typically developing children (Charman, Baron-Cohen, Swettenham, Baird, 
Cox, & Drew, 2000). Joint attention and imitation abilities are thought to indicate a social 
cognitive representational ability to interact and understand people, whereas the ability to 
play and imitate can indicate a cognitive representational ability to interact with objects. 
All of these abilities are all required to obtain mental representations of various persons‘ 
perspectives. It is these perspectives, which allow an individual to have a fully 
functioning ToM.   
Skills acquired as young as infancy including joint attention abilities such as 
protodeclarative pointing, following gaze, and following pointing, are all evidence that a 
child has an emerging understanding of others as intentional agents. This understanding 
is a social cognitive ability that is a piece of the foundation for ToM (Charman et al. 
2000). Another skill that emerges in early childhood that is related to ToM is pretend 
play. Pretending is the cognitive capacity to represent and influence one‘s own attitudes 
towards information (Leslie, 1987, 1994). Therefore, pretend play is thought to influence 
later development of ToM because it enables a child to not only manipulate their own 
thoughts about information but to represent and manipulate the thoughts of others.  A 
third early emerging skill that is thought to be associated with the development of ToM is 
imitation of gestures. The age of emergence of imitational gestures has also been reported 
 5 
to be moderately associated with the emergence of referential language (Carpenter et al., 
1998).  
Children with ASD have been reported to be impaired in all three areas, joint 
attention, pretend play, and imitation, proposed to be precursors to the development of a 
ToM (Charman et al., 2000). Because both play and imitation of gestures are associated 
with language abilities (Carpenter et al., 1998; Charman et al., 2000; Steiglitz Ham & 
Bartolo, 2012), this suggests that a deficit in these skill areas could result in language 
impairments. Further, ToM abilities would be negatively affected due to the close 
relationship between language and ToM (Astington & Jenkins, 1996; Pyers & Senghas, 
2009; Tager-Flusberg, 2007). Frequency of joint attention during social situations has a 
strong correlation with performance on ToM tasks (Hughes, 1998). In addition, those 
with ASD have difficulty comprehending and using gestures as a means to express 
language; therefore, they do not use them to refer to people or objects and may lack 
communicative gestures as a means to express language (Steiglitz Ham & Bartolo, 2012). 
These underlying early deficits in social cognitive abilities have been argued to result in 
the later manifestation of a deficit in ToM in ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Charman et 
al., 2000). When viewed in the perspective of Baron-Cohen‘s theory, which states that an 
impairment in social cognition causes the ToM deficit, the characteristic symptoms of 
ASD including difficulty with pretend play and difficulty with nonliteral language are 
interpreted as resulting from the inability to represent an outside individual‘s thoughts 
(Fogeot d‘Arc & Mottron, 2012).  
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Language and ToM 
Most individuals with ASD have a general delay in the acquisition of spoken 
language and continuing difficulties with the comprehension and use of language (Tager-
Flusberg, 1993).  If the development of language and ToM are highly related, the 
language difficulties experienced by the ASD population could negatively affect their 
ToM ability.  
It has been argued for quite some that ToM is related to language development in 
typically developing children (Astington & Jenkins, 1996; Tager-Flusberg, 2007). More 
recently, Farrant and colleagues (2012) examined the cognitive and linguistic factors that 
might affect the development of ToM. The Cognitive Complexity and Control theory 
(CCC) and/or the Cognitive Complexity and Control Theory-Revised (CCC-r) argue that 
ToM development is dependent upon cognitive flexibility or flexible perspective taking 
in that one must be able to shift between sets of judgments based on the social situation at 
hand (Frye, Zelaro, & Burack, 1998). According to this theoretical model, the higher 
order tasks required to shift between various perspectives are formed linguistically via 
silent self-directed speech (Farrant et al., 2012). Therefore, the linguistic ability to 
formulate and comprehend both an individual‘s perspective and an appropriate response 
is required, and language is thought to facilitate ToM development.  
Farrant and colleagues (2012) also posed the idea that ToM and language 
acquisition are highly correlated. For example, ―A number of studies have found delayed 
ToM development in children with SLI [specific language impairment]‖ (Farrant et al., 
2012, p. 221). Additionally, Astington and Jenkins (1999) conducted a study and found 
that 3 year olds‘ language ability was a significant predictor of ToM ability 7 months 
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later; however ToM ability at age 3 did not predict language ability (p. 224). This 
provides further evidence of a correlation between the development of language and the 
development of ToM. Moreover, this suggests language as a precursor for developing a 
fully functioning ToM.  
Maternal linguistic input, which is the inclination of mothers to think of and 
describe their child based on their mental attributes and to treat their child as an 
individual with his/her own mind, has also been found to have an effect on ToM.  This 
―maternal mind-mindedness‖ encompasses mothers using mentalistic language when 
talking to their child. Therefore, the comprehension and application of this input is 
thought to be necessary to develop a ToM. A study conducted by Farrant and colleagues 
(2012) compared typically developing children to children with SLI. They compared 
performance on false belief tasks, memory for false complements, cognitive flexibility 
tasks, and maternal language input using Peterson and Slaughter‘s Maternal Mental State 
Input Inventory. The results supported the hypothesis that memory for false complements 
and cognitive flexibility contribute to explicit false belief understanding. In addition, 
memory for false complements predicted cognitive flexibility, and the relationship 
between maternal language input and the development of a child‘s ToM was mediated by 
cognitive flexibility (Farrant et al., 2012). These results also indicated that executive 
functions including cognitive flexibility and working memory for false complements had 
a direct effect on ToM. 
Executive Dysfunction Theory 
The findings of the research conducted by Farrant and colleagues (2012) provide 
support not only for the role of language in ToM development but also for the role of 
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executive functions. This is consistent with earlier work that argued that the ToM deficit 
in ASD was the result of difficulty with executive functions (Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 
2004; Russell, Saltmarsh, & Hill, 1999; Tager-Flusberg, 2007). Executive functions are 
cognitive skills that are thought to arise from the frontal lobe of the brain, particularly the 
pre-frontal cortex (Baddeley & Wilson, 1988; Stuss & Benson, 1986). Executive 
functions are what are thought of as the higher order processes of the brain. They are the 
ability to guide actions and/or behavior and use cognitive skills to achieve a future 
behavior or future goal. Aspects of executive functioning include, but are not limited to, 
planning, impulse control, inhibition, working memory, set maintenance, problem 
solving, cognitive flexibility, set-shifting, organization, self-monitoring, awareness over 
time, mental representation of tasks, attention, self-correction, rapid retrieval of relevant 
information, and mental operations.   
The theory of executive dysfunction has been proposed to explain the etiology of 
the symptoms associated with ASD. This theory originated in 1978 with Damasio and 
Maurer, who compared the symptoms of individuals with ASD to those of patients with 
frontal lobe injuries (Griffith, Pennington, Wehner, & Rogers, 1999). Behavioral 
similarities between individuals with ASD and patients who have acquired frontal lobe 
lesions include repetitive behaviors, a desire for consistency, a lack of impulse control, 
difficulty with initiation of unfamiliar activities, and a deficit in cognitive flexibility 
(Robinson, Goddard, Dritschel, Wisley, & Howlin, 2009). The general conclusion, based 
on extensive research, is that there are deficits in executive functioning in individuals 
with ASD, varying in both the degree of the deficit and the domains in which there are 
deficits (Hill, 2004). Furthermore, a number of neuroimaging studies have found that 
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individuals with ASD not only have abnormal pre-frontal cortex structure and function, 
but also have decreased functional connectivity between their frontal cortex and other 
cortical and subcortical structures (Carper & Courchesne, 2005; Hazlett, Poe, Smith, & 
Piven, 2005; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, Kana, & Minshew, 2006; Villalobos, Mizuno, 
Dahl, Kemmotsu, & Müller, 2005). Thus, a problem with executive functioning in ASD 
has been supported by both behavioral and neurofunctional research.  
 Executive functioning and ToM abilities.  Individuals with ASD have been 
reported to be severely impaired on both executive function tasks and tasks involving 
ToM (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Hughes, Russell, & Robbins, 1994; Ozonoff, 
Pennington, & Rogers, 1991). Furthermore, performance in these two domains is highly 
correlated (Ozonoff et al., 1991), suggesting either a causal relationship between these 
two abilities or a shared underlying causal factor. Lastly, studies have demonstrated that 
ToM tasks require the application of executive functions to be completed (Moore, 
Jarrold, Russell, Lumb, Sapp, & McCallan, 1995; Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, & Tidswell, 
1991), also suggesting a strong association between these two skill sets.  
Hughes (1998) explored the relationship of executive functions and young 
children‘s ToM using the three factor model of executive functions (i.e., working 
memory, inhibitory control, and cognitive flexibility) from Welsh et al., (1991) to guide 
selection of tasks.  Fifty nursery-school aged children were given a battery of six 
executive functioning tasks and six ToM tasks. Results of the study indicated that the 
type of task (e.g., predicting where a person would look vs. explaining what the person 
was thinking) and the structure of the task [e.g., object transfer (putting the object in a 
new location) vs. deceptive contents (putting a different object in the same location) 
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affected task performance. It could be argued that the verbal demands of the task 
impacted the performance in both the prediction and explanation tasks. Attentional 
flexibility was significantly correlated with deceit whereas working memory was 
significantly correlated with false belief prediction. Therefore, Hughes (1998) concluded 
that specific relations existed between ToM and working memory and attentional 
flexibility. Additional evidence of an association between ToM and executive functions, 
specifically working memory and cognitive flexibility has been provided from other 
research with preschool children with ASD (Mutter, Alcorn, & Maril, 2006). 
 Cognitive flexibility and ToM.  As mentioned above, it has been proposed that 
the ToM deficit in ASD is related to a more general impairment in executive functions 
such as cognitive flexibility and working memory. Cognitive flexibility is a higher order 
executive function which refers to the ability to change or shift a mental set, to 
appropriately shift one‘s thinking in response to dynamic environmental stimuli. 
Numerous studies focusing on executive functioning related to ASD indicate that there is 
a deficit in cognitive flexibility (Bennetto, Pennington, & Rogers, 1996; Ozonoff, 1995; 
Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994; Pascualvaca, Fantie, Papageorgiou, & Mirsky, 1998; Prior & 
Hoffman, 1990; Rumsey & Hambuger, 1988, 1990; Szatmari, Tuff, Finlayson, & 
Bartolucci, 1990). Cognitive flexibility is thought to be an important underlying cognitive 
process for ToM, which requires the ability to shift from one‘s own perspective to that of 
another person. The argument is made that, if an individual with ASD has difficulty 
switching mental sets, it could result in difficulty with changing perspectives or 
incorporating new information. The difficulty with cognitive flexibility would then result 
in a deficit in ToM.  
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Previous research has provided some evidence of a relationship between cognitive 
flexibility and ToM in typically developing children (Hughes, 1998) and those with SLI 
(Farrant et al., 2012). Farrant and colleagues (2012) argued that to develop ToM one 
must master the power of representation, or an ability to take on other perspectives which 
may conflict with one‘s own. According to the Cognitive Complexity and Control theory, 
being able to reason correctly in social situations is accomplished by flexibly shifting 
between various perspectives. In order to flexibly shift, different judgment sets must be 
embedded within one another. This theory claims that ToM development, in fact, relies 
on the development of the basic skill of cognitive flexibility (Farrant et al., 2012). The 
development of ToM relies on one‘s ability to engage with others socially and to 
understand the perspective of another individual outside of one‘s own. Cognitive 
flexibility allows for escaping a personal perspective to gain knowledge about another 
individual‘s thoughts. Therefore, without cognitive flexibility, we would lack the ability 
to escape our own minds and shift to another individual‘s thoughts. Thus, it can be 
hypothesized that cognitive flexibility would directly affect the development of ToM. 
Further support for the predominance of cognitive flexibility in the development 
of ToM in ASD is provided by research in which the relationships between ToM, verbal 
ability, and cognitive flexibility, and maternal linguistic input were examined (Farrant et 
al., 2012). The results of this research indicated that memory for false complements and 
explicit false belief understandings were primarily mediated by cognitive flexibility. 
Cognitive flexibility was also found to both contribute to the development of false belief 
understanding and to mediate the relationship between maternal linguistic input and a 
child‘s ToM development. Maternal linguistic input and false belief understanding both 
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have a direct effect on ToM, and, therefore, cognitive flexibility has both a direct and 
indirect effect on this ability.   
However, executive functioning is not necessarily separable from linguistic 
functioning making it potentially difficult to assess the differing effects of these two 
processes on ToM in ASD.  According to Sanders and colleagues (2008), deficits in 
executive functioning were reported to have an impact on the function of lower-order 
processes such as language (Sanders, Johnson, Garavan, Gill, & Gallagher, 2008).  
Moreover, the perseverative tendencies or lack of cognitive flexibility within the ASD 
population are thought to be attributable to the level of verbal abilities rather than the 
ASD diagnosis per se (Liss, Fein, Dunn, Feinstein, & Morris, 2001).   
 Working memory and ToM. Working memory is the ability to hold information 
―on line‖ within the brain and recall that information at a later time when appropriate. 
According to Gabig (2008), it involves both storage and processing of information. It is a 
regulatory control, which may be influenced by a limited capacity.  It is the limited 
capacity nature of working memory that may be related to ToM. For example, the 
―Smarties‖ [a brand of small candies] task has frequently been used to assess ToM but 
performance on the task may be affected by the child‘s working memory capacity. In this 
task, the child is shown a box labeled ―Smarties,‖ in which lies an item that is not a piece 
of candy, such as a coin. The child is then asked what a novel person would think is in 
the box.  This requires that the child recall an original erroneous belief (that the box 
contained candy) via working memory and apply it to another‘s thoughts, despite 
information that may be most salient in the working memory (i.e. coin). Therefore, the 
child may perform poorly on the ToM component not because of a deficit in this area but 
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because of a deficit in working memory, resulting in the child having difficulty recalling 
his or her earlier (but discarded) thoughts. 
Mutter and colleagues (2006) conducted a study looking at the relationship 
between false-belief tasks and executive functioning abilities, specifically working 
memory capacity and inhibitory control in preschool children ages 2.8 to 5.4 years. They 
examined working memory as it relates to ToM or false-belief using a variation of the 
―Smarties‖ task described above. The results of the study were interpreted to indicate that 
a child‘s performance on false-belief tasks was dependent not only on the development of 
a ToM but also on the child‘s ability to apply this knowledge with the latter being related 
to the child‘s working memory capacity.  Furthermore, their findings suggested that as 
children age, their working memory abilities increase with a concurrent increase in ToM 
abilities. The thought is that individuals must possess the working memory capacity to 
obtain the rules associated with ToM, in addition to the complex ability to maintain these 
rules in a hierarchical structure. In other words, it is not enough to realize that other 
people have thoughts and to make inferences about what these thoughts might be. One 
needs to be able to hold information on-line to accomplish the associated reasoning task. 
Mutter and colleagues explain that multiple studies with children with typical 
development have found evidence of improvement in false belief task execution as 
working memory capacity improves, suggesting a strong relationship between working 
memory and ToM (Mutter et al., 2006). 
Just as cognitive flexibility is difficult to separate from language, similar close 
connections have been found between language and verbal working memory in ASD. 
Gabig (2008) indicated that deficits in verbal working memory may result in deficits in 
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language learning and competence. Gabig investigated verbal working memory in 15 
school-aged children with ASD using 3 verbal working memory tasks, including 
nonword repetition, memory for digits span, and sentence imitation. She also assessed 
story recall using The Renfrew Bus Story. Her results support the theory that an increase 
in the complexity of information results in poorer performance on verbal memory tasks.  
According to Gabig (2008), ―It appears children with ASD have a significant difficulty in 
tasks that require the parallel construction and processing of complex linguistic and 
cognitive representations to support their verbal working memory performance‖ (p. 508). 
She suggested that poor performance on these verbal working memory tasks can be 
explained with a connectionist model, meaning that verbal working memory and 
language processing both fall under the ―language processing competence‖ category, thus 
a language processing deficit, such as one experienced by those with ASD, will cause 
impairments in verbal working memory skills as well.  
Further evidence of the connectedness of language and verbal working memory 
skill in ASD was provided by Kjelgaard and Tager-Flusberg (2001). They found that 
children with ASD who had more difficulty with language tasks also had increased 
difficulty on tasks requiring phonological working memory. This result supports a link 
between working memory ability and language ability in ASD.  
Based on the results of neuropsychological studies with children and adults with 
ASD, Williams, Goldstein, and Minshew (2006) argued that the cognitive profile in ASD 
suggests a constraint in information-processing with the most affected domains being the 
ones which placed the highest demands on information processing (Williams et al., p. 9). 
Therefore, working memory tasks involving complex information processing and 
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integration of information, such as integrating and applying a ToM to conversation, 
would be difficult for those who are diagnosed with ASD.  Not only must one recognize 
that others have their own individual thoughts, but one must also use this information to 
come to a conclusion about the nature of the thoughts of the other  individual, and then 
integrate these potential abstract ideas of his/her communication partner into a social 
interaction in order to make it appropriate. Linguistic skills are required to formulate 
someone else‘s ideas in one‘s mind via silent self-talk. Following the formation of these 
linguistic concepts in one‘s mind, these concepts must then be held ―on line‖ and applied 
to someone else‘s thinking. This would require adequate verbal working memory to 
accomplish within a social interaction.  
Prior research evidence indicates that working memory impairments in ASD are 
related to the complexity of the information or language required to hold the information 
―on-line‖ (Williams, Carpenter, Goldstein, & Minshew, 2005). Therefore, based on the 
complex processes and linguistic skills required for ToM, it is hypothesized that verbal 
working memory impairment will correlate with a disordered ToM.   
Conclusion  
Individuals with ASD experience impairments in the areas of social cognition, 
executive functioning, and language. The current study aims to look at the effects of these 
abilities (i.e. social cognition, executive functioning, and language) on the ToM deficit 
within the ASD population.  Any examination of the effects of these individual skills is 
complicated because these skills are not entirely disassociated, making them difficult to 
view as completely separate elements within a ToM framework. For example, ToM 
deficits appear to have a direct effect on the social cognitive and social communicative 
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deficits, while linguistic and executive functioning deficits may have a direct effect on 
ToM and be related to social communicative deficits. Examination of all of these factors 
within a coherent sample of individuals with ASD may help to illuminate the 
relationships between them. 
 Evidence has suggested that ASD presents with atypical or low social cognitive 
and social communication skills (Baron Cohen et al., 1985; Charman et al., 2000; Fogeot 
d‘Arc, & Mottron, 2012; Hadjikhani, Joseph, Snyder, & Tager-Flusberg, 2006). Baron 
Cohen‘s theory (1985) proposes that the social cognition deficit in ASD directly 
correlates with the ToM impairment. If the ToM deficit is specific to an impairment in 
social cognition or the social brain, one would expect to find a strong relationship 
between ToM performance and social interaction measures, which would ultimately 
represent an underlying problem with social functioning. However, social cognition 
impairments may not cause the ToM deficit, but rather the ToM deficit may be caused by 
some other aspect (i.e. language delay, executive dysfunction) which may then contribute 
to the social cognitive problems seen within the disorder.  
Evidence also suggests executive functioning deficits may also contribute to the 
problem with ToM (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Hughes, Russell, & Robbins, 1994; 
Joseph, Tager-Flusberg, 2004; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991; Russell, Saltmarsh, 
& Hill, 1999; Tager-Flusberg, 2007). For example, it has been proposed that verbal 
working memory and cognitive complexity are executive function skills which affect 
ToM (Farrant et al., 2012). Similar to the ―higher-order mental representations‖ (i.e. 
rules, generalizations, and concepts) (Ridley, 1994), Farrant and colleagues (2012) 
describe higher order rules which must be formed linguistically via silent self-directed 
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speech, and which are required for flexible perspective shifting. If individuals with ASD 
are unable to linguistically form these concepts due to their language impairments, the 
concepts would not exist. In addition to forming these concepts, they may lack adequate 
verbal working memory to hold these concepts within their brain for use. This would 
result in a lack of flexible perspective taking, presenting as a deficit in cognitive 
flexibility. Thus, based on this theory, it is hypothesized that verbal working memory 
would also have a direct effect on cognitive flexibility and an indirect effect on TOM. 
Verbal working memory, or the ability to hold verbal information within the brain 
for later use, is required for a sufficient ability to understand others‘ perspectives. These 
perspectives are most likely formulated within the brain using the language system, 
therefore they are formed verbally. A verbal working memory is essential to recall these 
various thoughts and ideas of other individuals after they have been silently verbalized 
within the brain. After linguistically coding them, they must be accurately recalled in 
order to apply a perspective to respond appropriately.  Consequently, the brain must 
formulate a verbal response to the stimuli. Once this verbal response is formulated, it 
must be accurately recalled and used within conversation appropriately. Furthermore, 
throughout conversation, it is possible that the communication partner may have changes 
within his or her thinking. To maintain social appropriateness, verbal working memory is 
also required to recall the information exchanged linguistically within the conversation 
and continue creating the new ideas of the communication partner based on the 
information shared. Therefore, the following functions require verbal working memory in 
order to an individual to present with a fully functioning ToM: formulating and 
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understanding individuals‘ perspectives, producing appropriate responses to each 
perspective, and recalling shared information to infer a novel thought or idea.   
 Cognitive flexibility, or the ability to shift mind-sets based on certain situations, is 
an imperative skill for ToM. It is the executive function which allows you to react 
differently to each communication situation or task based on the ability to infer ideas. 
Without possession of cognitive flexibility, appropriate social communication in various 
settings would pose as difficult. Novel responses are required based on the 
communication setting, communication partner, and communication atmosphere. The 
ability to generate novel responses stems from cognitive flexibility, as a variety of 
responses would require a variety of mind-sets and to elicit shifting between mind-sets. 
Therefore, if only one individual‘s thoughts and ideas are focused on (i.e. one‘s own), the 
result in perseverative behavior. The general task forming the concept of ToM, thinking 
outside of one‘s own mind, requires cognitive flexibility in itself.  Therefore, this is an 
imperative task in order to generate novel responses based on various communication 
situations and understand thoughts outside of one‘s own head, causing a direct effect on 
ToM ability. 
As discussed earlier, researchers believe language ability may correlate with ToM 
abilities (Astington & Jenkins, 1996; Pyers & Senghas, 2009; Tager-Flusberg, 2007). 
Because verbal working memory requires verbal skills and linguistic coding, it is 
hypothesized that language skills would have an effect on ToM.  A decrease in language 
ability would result in a decreased ability to linguistically form individuals‘ thoughts and 
ideas within the brain, verbally form novel and appropriate responses, and comprehend 
and apply linguistic information exchange within a conversation. Related to cognitive 
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flexibility, to understand various perspectives, one must be able to shift mind-sets and 
decode these linguistically stored mind-sets within the brain. A deficit in language would 
result in a lack of ability to comprehend the mind-sets of other individuals. Without 
understanding different perspectives, one cannot change mind-sets, resulting in 
perseverative behavior. Moreover, research has supported that language development and 
ToM development exhibit a close relationship (Astington & Jenkins, 1996; Pyers & 
Senghas, 2009; Tager-Flusberg, 2007). Therefore, delayed language skills may result in 
deficient ToM skills.  
 The relationships between measures of ToM and factors such as social cognition, 
language, and executive function have been examined in previous studies.  However, 
these studies have primarily focused on investigation of one of these factors and the 
sample sizes have generally been limited and the primary focus has been on either 
children or adults with ASD but rarely a wider range of ages in a single study.  Two 
sizeable samples of well-diagnosed children and adults with ASD with ages ranging from 
8 to 55 years were available as part of larger programs of research.  These samples 
included basic measures of social interaction, language, verbal memory, and ToM on all 
the participants. Furthermore, subgroups within these samples had more specific 
measures of language, verbal working memory, and cognitive flexibility making it 
possible to examine relationships between these variables in a cohesive set of individuals. 
Detailed information about each of these samples is provided in the Methods section. 
 It was hoped that this study would provide further understanding about the 
underlying factors which contribute to the ToM deficits within the ASD population.  
More specifically, the goal was to further clarify the relationships between social 
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cognition, language, executive functioning and ToM.  If ToM is primarily related to 
social cognition, a high correlation between ToM measures and social interaction 
measures on the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord, Rutter, 
DiLavore, & Risi, 2001) and Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R; Le Couteur, 
Lord, & Rutter, 2003) (representing an underlying problem with social functioning) 
would occur.  If ToM is primarily related to language functioning, a high correlation with 
language measures, and/or the communication measures from ADOS and ADI, and 
Verbal IQ would occur. If ToM is primarily related to executive functioning, a high 
correlation with executive function measures, particularly measures of working memory 
and cognitive flexibility would occur.  
 The hypotheses tested were: 
Hypothesis 1:  Theory of Mind performance is related to measures of social cognition in 
children and adults with high-functioning autism. 
Hypothesis 2: Theory of Mind performance is related to measures of language in 
children and adults with high-functioning autism. 
Hypothesis 3: Theory of Mind performance is related to measures of working memory 
and cognitive flexibility in children and adults with high-functioning autism. 
Methods 
Participants  
The above hypotheses were tested using previously collected data from two 
samples or groups of individuals with ASD ranging in age from 5 to 55 years. The data 
were collected as part of two program project grants at the University of Pittsburgh 
Center for Autism Research (CeFAR), the Collaborative Programs of Excellence in 
Autism (CPEA) and the Autism Centers of Excellence (ACE). The studies were funded 
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by the National Institute of Child Health and Development (NICHD). The data analyses 
were separated into three separate sets of analyses to address each of the hypotheses.  
The diagnostic procedures and criteria for each of the samples were the same.  All 
participants met criteria for autism or autism spectrum disorder on the ADOS and ADI-R 
administered by clinicians trained to research reliability on the diagnostic instruments. 
The diagnosis was verified by expert clinical opinion using DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) 
criteria. In addition, all participants had Full Scale, Performance, and Verbal IQs greater 
than or equal to 70 as measured by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(WASI; Wechsler, 1999). Exclusions were based on neurological history and 
examination, physical examination, chromosomal analysis, and metabolic testing if 
indicated. Potential participants were excluded if found to have evidence of an associated 
neurological, genetic, infectious, or metabolic disorder, such as tuberous sclerosis, fragile 
X syndrome, or cytomegalovirus. The diagnostic measures are described in more detail in 
the section below. 
Sample #1 (CPEA) consisted of 115 individuals with ASD (73 individuals ages 8 
to 15 years and 42 individuals ages 16 to 54 years), mean age 16.6 (SD = 8.3; range 8.7 
to 53.8). It included 103 males and 12 females with mean VIQ 100.1 (SD = 13.2; range 
73 to 133), mean PIQ 103 (SD = 14.7; range 66 to 134), and mean FSIQ 101.6 (SD = 
13.3; range 73 to 133) as measured by the WASI.  
Sample #2 (ACE) consisted of 157 individuals with ASD (93 individuals ages 5 
to 15 years and 64 individuals ages 16 to 55 years), mean age 15.9 (SD = 7.6; range 6.0 
to 45.1). It included 136 males and 21 females with mean VIQ 108.1 (SD = 14.5; range 
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74 to 141), mean PIQ 108.7 (SD = 13.9; range 76 to 144), and mean FSIQ 109.2 (SD = 
13.6; range 76 to 146).  
When possible, the two samples were aggregated to increase the power of the 
analyses. This dataset contained 272 participants with ASD (166 individuals ages 5 to 15 
years and 106 individuals ages 16 to 55 years) mean age 16.2 (SD = 7.9; range 6.0 to 
53.8). It included 239 males and 33 females) with mean VIQ 104.7 (SD = 14.5; range 73 
to 141), mean PIQ 106.3 (SD = 14.5; range 66 to 144), and mean FSIQ 106 (SD = 13.9; 
range 73 to 146).  
For other analyses, the groups were separated into children and adults because 
these age groups had been administered different measures or in order to examine more 
closely possible developmental differences.  Subgroups from the two large samples were 
also used for some of the analyses based on the specific measures that were available.  
Diagnostic Measures 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS). The ADOS (Lord et al., 
2001) is an assessment tool that was developed to provide objective standards for the 
diagnosis of autism and pervasive developmental disorder across ages, developmental 
levels, and language skills. It consists of 4 modules, designed for differing developmental 
and language levels based on an individual‘s age and use of expressive language and 
chronological age. The participants in the two samples were assessed using either Module 
3 or Module 4 as age appropriate. Results of the ADOS are based on standardized 
behavioral observation and coding, and it contains cutoff scores for a narrow diagnosis of 
autism and a broader diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder.  
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Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised (ADI-R).  The Autism Diagnostic 
Interview – Revised (ADI-R; Le Couteur et al., 2003) was developed to diagnose autism, 
plan treatment, and distinguish between autism and other developmental disorders based 
on reports of case history information and current functioning levels. It is appropriate for 
children and adults with a mental age above 2.0 years and targets the three functional 
domains of language/communication, reciprocal social interactions, and restricted, 
repetitive, and stereotyped behaviors. The assessment contains a standardized interview 
focusing on eight areas including the participant's background (i.e. family, education, 
previous diagnoses, and medications), overview of the participant's behavior, early 
development and developmental milestones, language acquisition and loss of language or 
other skills, current functioning in regard to language and communication, social 
development and play, interests and behaviors, clinically relevant behaviors, such as 
aggression, self-injury, and possible epileptic features. The interviewer then codes the 
informant‘s responses and domain scores are calculated for the three functional domains 
and age at onset of developmental problems.  
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI). The Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) was designed as a short version of the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children—third edition (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991) and 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale--third edition (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997a), and it 
targets the population ranging in age from 6.0-89.0. This assessment provides scores for a 
verbal IQ, performance IQ, and full scale IQ, and was used to obtain the aforementioned 
IQ scores for the study’s participants. It consists of 4 subtests, all chosen based on the 
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WISC-III and the WAIS-III. According to Buros (2012), it is an excellent instrument for 
a quick estimate of one’s intellectual functioning.                       
ToM Measures (Dependent Variables) 
The dependent variables in all analyses were the measures of ToM derived from 
the performance on the traditional measures of ToM, the Sally and Anne, John and Mary, 
and Peter and Jane tasks.  In both administration to participants in CPEA and ACE, the 
Sally and Anne and the John and Mary stories were represented with real objects/props. 
The Peter and Jane story was presented verbally without props. Participants in Sample 
#2 had an additional ToM measure, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test-Revised (Eyes 
test) that was included in relevant analyses as described below. 
Sally and Anne.  The Sally and Anne task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) is used to 
assess first order ToM because the individual must only identify one other person‘s 
thoughts about something. The Sally and Anne story is as follows: 
This is Sally and this is Anne. Sally first placed a marble into her basket. Then she 
left and the marble was moved, by Anne, into her hidden box. Then Sally returned. 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; adapted from Wimmer & Perner, 1983) 
Belief Question: Where will Sally look for her marble? 
Reality Question: Where is the marble really? 
Memory Question: Where was the marble in the beginning? 
If the individual recognizes that Sally will look in the basket for her marble, then 
he or she has a ToM because they have obtained an understanding of Sally‘s perspective. 
However, if they believe Sally will look in the box for her ball, the examinee lacks the 
understanding of Sally‘s perspective, and thus lacks the ToM ability.  
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John and Mary. The John and Mary task (Perner & Wimmer, 1985) is used to 
assess second order ToM in ASD (Baron-Cohen, 1989) because it requires the examinee 
to identify someone else‘s thoughts about another individual‘s false-belief ideas. The 
John and Mary story is as follows: 
This is John and this is Mary. They live in this village. Here they are in the park. 
Along comes the ice cream man. John would like to buy an ice cream but he has 
left his money at home. He is very sad. ―Don’t worry,‖ says the ice cream man, 
―you can go home and get your money and buy some ice cream later. I’ll be here 
in the park all afternoon.‖ ―Oh good,‖ says John, ―I’ll be back in the afternoon 
to buy an ice cream.‖ So John goes home. He lives in this house. Now, the ice 
cream man says, ―I am going to drive my van to the church to see if I can sell my 
ice creams outside there.‖ The ice cream man drives over to the church. On his 
way he passes John’s house. John sees him and says, ―Where are you going?‖ 
The ice cream man says, ―I’m going to sell some ice cream outside the church.‖ 
So off he drives to the church. Now Mary goes home. She lives in this house. Then 
she goes to John’s house. She knocks on the door and says ―Is John in?‖ ―No,‖ 
says his mother, ―he’s gone out to buy an ice cream.‖ (Baron-Cohen, 1989; 
adapted from Wimmer & Perner, 1985) 
Belief Question: Where does Mary think John has gone to buy an ice cream? 
Reality Question: Where did John really go to buy his ice cream? 
Memory Question: Where was the ice cream man in the beginning? 
Because the examinee must infer what John‘s thoughts are about Mary‘s thoughts, 
this is considered second order ToM. Therefore, if the examinee answered ―the park,‖ he 
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or she has accurately understood John‘s perspective about Mary‘s thoughts and therefore 
has a ToM.  
Peter and Jane. The Peter and Jane Shopping Story (Bowler, 1992) is a second-
order false belief task. The story involves two friends shopping for a coat for Peter. Each 
friend learns information about the availability of a particular coat but from different 
sources. The child is then asked some standard questions to determine whether he or she 
understands what information is shared by the two friends. It is a second-order task 
because the child is asked to infer what Jane thinks about what Peter knows. The Peter 
and Jane story is as follows: 
Peter and Jane are out shopping on their lunch hour. Peter wants to buy an 
overcoat and the nicest one he has seen is at Wal-Mart. But before he makes up 
his mind, he would like to go to K-Mart to see what they have in stock. So they 
both go to K-Mart where they look at some coats. These are not as nice as the 
ones as Wal-Mart, so Peter decides to go back to Wal-Mart that evening after 
work to buy his coat. At 5:00 that afternoon Peter phones Wal-Mart to make sure 
that they have a coat of his size still in stock. Unfortunately they tell him that they 
have just sold the last one and that they don’t know when they will be getting any 
more in. By 5:20 Jane has not arrived at Peter’s office, so Peter decides that he 
had better go alone to buy his coat before the shops close. At 5:25 Jane arrives at 
Peter’s office. She is late because she popped in to Wal-Mart on her way and 
found out that they had no more of the coats Peter liked in stock. (Bowler, 1992) 
Belief Question: Where does Jane think Peter has gone to buy his coat? 
Reality Question: Where has Peter really gone to buy his coat? 
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Memory Question: In which shop did Peter see the coat he liked best? 
Aggregated measure from traditional measures of ToM.  A single measure of 
ToM was constructed from the three different traditional ToM measures using a scale in 
which points are awarded to the questions which test for ToM and added to create a total 
score. The questions selected from the ToM tasks to be included in scoring the ToM 
measure were the belief question, the reality question, and the memory question. The 
selection of these specific questions was based on a study completed by D.M. Bowler 
(1997), who used the exact same Peter-Jane task and John-Mary task to assess ToM in 
HFA. Bowler (1997) credited his subject with passing the belief task only if they had 
answered the reality and memory question correctly. Participants in this study were 
awarded one point for each selected question answered correctly (i.e. belief, memory, 
reality), making a maximum score of three possible for each individual task. After each 
participant‘s scores were calculated for the individual tasks, they were added to create the 
total ToM score. Therefore, the total maximum score for the ToM measure was nine.  
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test-Revised (Eyes test).  The Reading the Mind 
in the Eyes Test-Revised (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Rask, & Plumb, 2001) was 
administered as a measure of ToM that is supposed to be more appropriate for use with 
verbal, high-functioning individuals with ASD. It determines the ability of an individual 
to recognize the feelings of someone while only viewing the information provided by 
their eyes, a task that is thought to ―detect subtle differences in social sensitivity‖ (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001, p. 241). The examinee is asked to attribute a feeling or thought to 
another individual by reading only part of their facial expression. . Each item contains a 
photo of a person‘s eyes accompanied by four written choices (e.g. distrusting, amused, 
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confident, shy). The examinee is asked to choose which feeling best matches the photo. 
The paper version of the test was used. For the adult administration, the adults 
independently read and completed all items.  Definitions were available if the participant 
indicated they were unfamiliar with any of the words. For the children, the written words 
were read aloud to them by the examiner.  In both cases, the selection was made by 
marking one of the four choices. Both the child and adult versions of the Eyes test were 
administered, with total possible scores of 28 and 36 respectively. This was accounted for 
via running separate models with the subgroups of children and adults in addition to 
models with the entire group of participants.  
Independent Variables 
For all analyses, the independent variables included measures of social cognition 
(taken from the ADOS and/or ADI-R as described below), language, verbal and spatial 
working memory, and cognitive flexibility.  These measures differed for each sample of 
participants as described in the different analyses for testing each of the null hypotheses.  
A description of each of these measures is provided below. 
Social cognition.  In some studies, the ToM measures described above are used 
as ―measures of social cognition‖; however, for the purposes of our analyses we used 
other independent indicators of social cognition and then examined the relationship of 
those measures to the measures of ToM. Because we were most interested in measures of 
social cognition that relate to actual social functioning, we used measures derived from 
relevant sections of the ADOS and ADI-R. The complete scores from these instruments 
were not used because they include additional items that measure general communication 
abilities (such as use of gestures) as well as measures of restricted, repetitive behaviors. It 
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is acknowledged that the use of partial measures from a formalized instrument is not 
without its limitations. However, this approach provided us with the best solution for an 
independent measure of social cognition for the available participant groups. The items 
chose from each instrument to construct the separate measures of social cognition were 
ones that the test authors indicated were measures of this area as well as ones related to 
the social use of communication. 
Depending on the age of the participant either module 3 or 4 of the ADOS was 
administered; however the relevant questions selected to construct the measure of social 
cognition were consistent across both modules. The following areas were selected from 
the ADOS to create a score for social cognitive ability: offers information, requests 
information, conversation, eye contact, facial expressions directed to others, shared 
enjoyment in interaction, empathy/comments on other‘s emotions, insight, quality of 
social overtures, quality of social response, amount of reciprocal social communication, 
overall quality of rapport. The score assigned for each individual item was the actual 
score given by the administrator (usually a value from 0 to 3 with a score of 3 indicating 
a more significant impairment). In cases in which a score of 8 was assigned by the 
administrator (indicating that an item was not administered or was not applicable), it was 
treated as a null value, not adding to the overall total score for that individual. The 
maximum score which could be achieved on the social cognition score derived from the 
ADOS was 32, with a score closer to 0 representing a more intact social cognitive 
system. To distinguish this partial measure from the overall ADOS score, it will be 
referred to as ADOS-SocCog. 
 30 
The following areas were selected from the ADI-R to create a second score for 
social cognitive ability: social verbalization/chat, reciprocal conversation (within 
subject‘s level of language), attention to voice, spontaneous imitation of actions, 
imaginative play, imaginative play with peers, direct gaze, social smiling, showing and 
directing attention, offering to share, seeking to share his/her enjoyment with others, 
offering comfort, quality of social overtures, appropriateness of social responses, 
imitative social play, interest in children, response to approaches of other children, group 
play with peers, friendships, and social disinhibition. As for the ADI-R, the score for each 
item was the score assigned by the administrator (a value from 0 to 3 with a score of 3 
indicating a more significant impairment). In cases in which a score of 8 or 9 was 
assigned by the administrator (indicating that an item was not administered or was not 
applicable), it was treated as a null value, not adding to the overall total score for that 
individual. As a result, the maximum score which could be obtained on the ADI-R 
measure was 58, with a score closer to 0 indicating more intact social cognitive skills. To 
distinguish this partial measure from the overall ADI-R score, it will be referred to as 
ADI-SocCog. 
Language measures.  Several different language measures were used across both 
of the larger samples of participants.  These measures are described in more detail below. 
Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals – 3rd or 4th Edition (CELF-3 or 
4; Semel, Wiig, & Secord, 2003). The CELF-3 was designed to identify, diagnose, and 
provide follow-up evaluation of communication disorders in children and adolescents 
aged 6 to 21 years of age. The CELF-4 was developed with these same intentions for 
children and adolescents aged 5 to 21 years with revised subtests and the addition of an 
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Observation Rating Scale and a Pragmatics Profile. The Semantic Relations subtest 
(CELF-3 & 4) was administered to both the child and adult participants of sample #1. 
Word Classes 1 or 2 (CELF-4) and Recalling Sentences (CELF-4) were administered to 
approximately 23 child participants in sample #2. The objectives of the Semantic 
Relationships subtest include evaluating the individual‘s ability to interpret the meaning 
of sentences that make comparisons, identify location or direction, specify time 
relationships, include serial order, or are expressed in passive voice. The examinee is 
given a verbally presented stimulus with four visually presented options, two of which 
must be selected as the correct choices. This subtest can help identify difficulties with 
perceiving and interpreting semantic relationships in sentences and in discourse, which 
may occur as a result of poor ability to analyze and synthesize critical concepts and key 
words, difficulty forming internal images of objects/events which are being compared, 
rigid word associations, and/or difficulty with retaining and recalling word order within a 
sentence (Semel et al., 2003). 
 The objective of the Recalling Sentences subtest is to evaluate the individual‘s 
ability to listen to spoken sentences of increasing length and complexity and repeat the 
sentences without changing word meanings, inflections, comparisons, or sentence 
structure. This provides a measure of the individual‘s verbal memory skills, as 
individuals with language disorders often have difficulties remembering verbal sentences 
with increasing structural complexity, word length, and conceptual density.  The 
examiner provides a verbal stimulus by reading a sentence aloud, and the examiner is 
expected to repeat the sentence exactly (Semel et al., 2003). 
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The objective of the Word Classes 1 and 2 is to measure the ability to perceive, 
understand, and explain relationships between pictures or spoken words which are 
associated by semantic class features. The Word Classes 1 subtest targets individuals 
ages 5 to 7 years, and the examinee is provided with 3 pictorial stimuli which correlates 
with the verbal stimuli presented by the examiner. The Word Classes 2 subtest targets 
ages 8 to 21 years, and the examinee is presented with 4 verbal stimuli. In both subtests, 
the participant must choose the 2 stimuli which are semantically related and describe the 
semantic class features which result in association of the words. Therefore, receptive 
language skills are measured by having the examinee comprehend the choices and choose 
the related words, and expressive language skills are measured by having the examinee 
explain why two words are related. This subtest can identify problems with word 
association skills, understanding different categories of words, identifying various 
relationships among words, word-finding, and explanations requiring organization of 
language output (Semel et al., 2003). 
Test of Language Competence – Expanded Edition (TLC-E; Wiig & Secord, 
1989). The TLC-E was administered to both the child and adult participants in Sample 
#2. Its target populations are ages 5.0 – 9.11 years (Level 1), and 9.0 - 18.11 years (Level 
2), and its purpose is to evaluate delays in the emergence of linguistic competence and in 
the use of semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic strategies. Language competence, as 
defined by the authors, is ―the understanding and/or expression of language content to the 
communicative demands of specific contents‖ (Buros).  Four subtests were administered: 
1) Ambiguous Sentences, 2) Listening Comprehension: Making Inferences, 3) Oral 
Expression: Recreating Speech Acts, and 4) Figurative Language.  Due to the age range 
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targeted by this assessment (5.0-18.11) compared with the age range of the population 
assessed (8-55 years), raw scores were not converted to scaled scores in order to avoid 
reaching a ceiling level, and the raw scores themselves were compared. 
Children’s Communication Checklist-2nd Edition (CCC-2; Bishop, 2006).  This 
measure targets the population aged 4 to16 years and was used to assess language and 
communication skills of the child participants (ages 8 to 15 years) in Sample #2. These 
skills are assessed via a checklist completed by the child‘s primary caregiver or a familiar 
adult. Responses are based on a 4-point rater scale and depend upon the frequency of 
communication behaviors observed. Purposes of the CCC-2 include the identification of 
pragmatic language impairment, screening of receptive and expressive language skills, 
and assistance in screening for ASD. Bishop designed the test to assess children's 
communication skills in the areas of pragmatics, syntax, morphology, semantics, and 
speech. It provides scores for 10 communication domains (i.e. speech, syntax, semantics, 
coherence, initiation, scripted language, context, nonverbal communication, social 
relations, and interests) in addition to a General Communication Composite (GCC) and a 
Social Interaction Difference Index (SIDI). Derived scaled scores and percentile ranks are 
provided for each scale. The GCC provides a normalized standard score, confidence 
interval, and percentile rank. The SIDI is the sum of performance on the scales assessing 
language and non-language features associated with ASD, and it is intended for 
descriptive use. 
Executive function measures. The measures of executive function included 
measures of verbal and spatial working memory and separate measures of cognitive 
flexibility.  These are described in more detail below. 
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Working memory.  Wechsler Memory Scale –third edition (WMS-III; Wechsler, 
1997b). 62 adult participants from Sample #2 were administered the Digit Span and 
Spatial Span subtests from the WMS-III. Because we wanted to use a measure of 
working memory that included the important level of maintenance of information while a 
second cognitive process was performed, we used only the performance of the 
participants on the Digit Span Backwards and Spatial Span Backwards portions of these 
subtests as working memory measures. The Digit Span Backwards assesses the 
individual‘s ability to receive and process verbal information in addition to manipulating 
that information while holding it on line within the brain. For example, the examinee is 
provided with a string of digits verbally and then required to hold the digits within his/her 
memory and manipulate this information in order to verbally produce the span of digits 
backwards. The total possible score for the Digit Span subtest is 14. Spatial Span 
Backwards operates with the same principles; however the examinee is provided with 
visuo-spatial information to process, hold on line, and manipulate. Because no separate 
standardized score is available for these portions of the working memory subtests, we 
used the raw scores that were the points awarded for correct performance of these items. 
The total possible score for Spatial Span subtest is 16. 
Children’s Memory Scale (CMS; Cohen, 1997).  A subgroup of 21 children from 
Sample #2 was administered the Number Memory task from the CMS 5-8 and a subgroup 
of 66 children from Sample #2 was administered the Number Memory task from the 
CMS 9-16 as a measure of working memory ability. Similar to the Digit span subtest 
from the WMS-III, the participant is provided with a string of digits verbally and then 
required to hold the digits within his/her memory and manipulate this information to 
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verbally produce the span of digits backwards. The maximum score for each of these 
assessments is 14. 
Cognitive flexibility. Twenty Questions (Olver & Hornsby, 1966). The Twenty 
Questions procedure is a measure of verbal reasoning and conceptual thinking; it is also 
considered a measure of cognitive flexibility. During the Twenty Questions test, the 
examinee is provided with a stimulus page containing 30 photos, and he or she must ask 
the least amount of yes/no questions in order to conclude what the target object is. This 
assesses visual attention and perception, object recognition, and object naming, in 
addition to requiring the examinees to identify categories and subcategories to place the 
objects in while formulating yes/no questions to either eliminate or include objects. This 
shifting among categories within the brain while formulating questions based on different 
properties of various objects requires the ability to shift mind-sets, or cognitive 
flexibility. If one focuses on only one category or one property (e.g. color) when 
formulating questions and is unable to shift mind-sets, limited information is received 
and reaching a conclusion about the correct item will pose as impossible. A total of 60 
participants (41 children, 19 adults) from Sample #1 were administered this test. The total 
number of questions asked by the participant was used as a measure of cognitive 
flexibility.  
Modified Vygotsky Concept Formation Test (Wang, 1983). The Modified 
Vygotsky Concept Formation Test was administered to 20 participants from Sample #1 (5 
adults, 16 children), and the number of perseverative errors will be used as one of the 
sources used to determine cognitive flexibility measures during analysis of data. The test 
is based on one of the first tests used by Lev Vygotsky (1934) to measure cognitive 
 36 
reasoning skills. It consists of 22 different blocks, all varying in 4 different dimensions 
(e.g. height, color, shape, width). It looks at both convergent and divergent thinking. To 
measure convergent thinking, the trained examiner shows a block to the examinee, and 
the examinee must then identify other blocks belonging in a specific category based on 
feedback provided by the examiner. After three consecutive errors, the examiner shows 
another block within the same category. The convergent test uses four kinds of 
information including total errors, perseverative errors (three consecutive errors based on 
the same erred dimension), number of cues provided by the examiner, and principles 
described by the examiner (transcribed verbal statements made by the examinee). There 
are a total of four trails, one for each dimension. To assess divergent thinking, the 
examinee is instructed to organize the blocks based on a dimension of his or her choice, 
and there are eight possible sortings. This is repeated as many times as necessary (Wang, 
1983) 
Data Analyses 
The three hypotheses represent different models of the relationship between the 
dependent variable of ToM and the independent variables of social cognition, language, 
working memory, and cognitive flexibility. To test the three hypotheses of the relationship 
between the variables, three different hierarchical multiple regression models were used. 
In each model, the ToM measure was the outcome or predicted variable. As described 
above, a single measure of ToM was constructed from the three different traditional ToM 
measures and was used as the dependent variable for the first group of analyses. A second 
set of analyses was also conducted using the Eyes test as the dependent variable. The 
availability of this measure for a sizeable number of the participants provided the 
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opportunity to determine whether the results from the first set of analyses using the 
traditional ToM measures could be replicated with a different ToM measure. 
In hierarchical multiple regression, as in multiple regression analysis, several 
independent variables predict a dependent variable (in this case the measures of ToM). In 
standard multiple regression analysis, this is done in a single equation that estimates the 
effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable, controlling for all other 
independent variables. Hierarchical multiple regression allowed us to enter independent, 
or sets of independent, variables in successive steps estimating separate models and the 
effects of different sets of independent variables. A hierarchical regression model 
indicates if subsequent independent variables add any predictive power to the model.  
Prior to running the regression models, we evaluated the independent variables for 
multicollinearity (to determine if the variables were highly correlated) by running a 
correlation matrix that included all the independent variables that were being considered 
for entry into the hierarchical multiple regressions. A high correlation suggested that 
particular variables were redundant and, therefore, would result in no added variance or 
effect on the dependent variable if added to the model (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  
These redundant variables would not all be needed in the same analysis. A correlation 
matrix was run separately for Sample #1 (CPEA) and Sample #2 (ACE) because the two 
sets of data had different measures.   
The correlation matrix for Sample #1 (CPEA) included the following independent 
variables: ADOS-SocCog, ADI-SocCog, Semantic Relations subtest (CELF-3 or CELF-
4), Verbal IQ, Twenty Questions, and the Modified Vygotsky Concept Formation test. 
Verbal IQ was determined to have significant correlation at the p < 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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with the Semantic Relations subtest (r = .445). Twenty Questions was significantly 
correlated at the p <0.05 level (2-tailed) with the Semantic Relations subtest (r = -.260); 
however, the value of r or the coefficient of correlation was well below the level of .50 
which indicates a potential problem with multicollinearity (Gujarati, 1978).  
The correlation matrix for Sample #2 (ACE) included the following independent 
variables: ADOS-SocCog, ADI-SocCog, CCC-2, Recalling Sentences subtest (CELF-3 
or CELF-4), Word Class subtest (CELF-3 and CELF-4), Verbal IQ, TLC total raw score, 
CMS 5-8 Numbers Backward subtest, CMS 9-16 Numbers Backward subtest, WMS 
Spatial Span Backward subtest, and WMS Digit Span Backward subtest. Verbal IQ was 
significantly correlated at the p <0.01 level (2-tailed) (and with an r value above .50) 
with the Recalling Sentences (r = .759), Word Class (r = .656), TLC total raw score (r = 
.554), CMS 5-8 Numbers Backward (r = .576). Word Class subtest and CMS 5-8 
Numbers Backward were significantly correlated at the p < .05 level (2-tailed) (r = .532).  
The high level of correlation between VIQ and the language measures was not 
unexpected; it indicated that both VIQ and the language measures should not be entered 
into the regression model. Therefore, it was decided to use Verbal IQ as the language 
measure for all the planned analyses because all participants in Sample #1 and Sample #2 
were assigned a VIQ score, it is a generalized measure of language skills, and it was 
highly correlated with all other language measures in both correlation matrices. Because 
the specific language measures used varied between both the CPEA and ACE groups, and 
the children and adults, the use of the VIQ score also had the advantage of allowing a 
collapse of the data across both participant groups and both age groups for some of the 
analyses. 
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Other significant correlations were also revealed for Sample #2 (ACE); however, 
these were all below an r value of .50 which indicates a potential problem with 
multicollinearity (Gujarati, 1978). They are reported here for completeness. Verbal IQ 
was significantly correlated at the p <0.01 level (2-tailed) with ADOS-SocCog (r = -
.337), CCC-2 (r = .321), WMS Digit Span Backward (r = .334), and WMS Spatial Span 
Backward (r = .349). Verbal IQ was significantly correlated at the p <0.05 level (2-tailed) 
with the ADI-SocCog (-.157). Other significant correlations at the p <0.01 level (2-
tailed) included the following: TLC and WMS Spatial Span Backward (r = .416) and 
WMS Digit Span Backward (r = .392), and WMS Digit span Backward and WMS Spatial 
Span Backward (r = .433). Additional significant correlations at the p <0.05 level (2-
tailed) included the following: ADOS-SocCog and TLC (r = -.182) and WMS Spatial 
Span Backward (-.269), ADI-SocCog and Verbal IQ (r = -.157) and TLC (r = -.180), 
TLC and CCC-2 (r = .300) and CMS 9-16 Numbers Backward (r = .274), and CMS 5-8 
Numbers Backward and Recalling Sentences (r = .475).   
A description of the mean values within each sample of participants is provided 
below. When a model was run using the hierarchical regression analyses, it was ensured 
that all the participants included in that model possessed a score for each independent 
variable (IV) entered. For example, although all participants were administered the 
ADOS and VIQ in Sample #1, only 62 participants were administered the WMS. When 
the WMS was included as an independent variable, the model only included those 62 
participants who had a score assigned to each IV entered into that specific model. Unless 
otherwise indicated below, all participants were administered an assessment.  
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Sample #1 (CPEA) mean values for the previously described assessments are as 
follows: mean ADOS-SocCog 17.1 (SD = 4.1; range 7 to 28), mean ADI-SocCog 40.0 
(SD = 8.8; range 17 to 60), mean ToM score 7.34 (SD = 1.4; range 3 to 9), mean Twenty 
Questions 45.1 (SD = 12.3; range 27 to 80; 63 participants), mean MVCF 2.4 (SD = 3.3; 
range 0 to 12; 20 participants). Only the traditional ToM tasks were utilized as dependent 
variables for Sample #1 secondary to the lack of participants administered the Eyes test. 
Sample #2 (ACE) mean values for the previously described assessments are as 
follows: mean ADOS-SocCog 13.4 (SD = 4.4; range 3 to 30), mean ADI-SocCog 39.2 
(SD = 9.2; range 13 to 67), mean ToM score 7.5 (SD = 1.6; range 3 to 9), mean Eyes test 
19.2 (SD = 5.4; range 7 to 32; 156 participants), mean WMS spatial span 7.7 (SD = 2.1; 
range 2 to 13; 62 participants), mean WMS digit span 6.8 (SD = 2.5; range 2 to 13; 63 
participants), mean CMS 9-16 5.3 (SD = 1.8; range 2 to 10; 66 participants), and mean 
CMS 5-8 4.0 (SD = 1.2; range 2 to 6; 21 participants).  
Mean values for the previously described assessments within the aggregated 
sample are as follows: mean ADOS-SocCog 14.9 (SD = 4.7; range 3 to 30), mean ToM 
score 7.4 (SD = 1.5; range 3 to 9), mean Eyes test 19.0 (SD = 5.4; range 5 to 32; 177 
participants). VIQ and ADOS-SocCog were the only IVs used within this dataset due to 
the fact that all participants from each sample did not have scores for ADI-SocCog and 
executive functioning measures were inconsistent between samples. 
Results 
Following the preliminary examination of the available variables, different 
combinations of the participants from the two samples were used to test the hypothesized 
models of prediction of ToM using hierarchical multiple regression, as described for each 
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hypothesis/model below.  For all of the models, age was used as a control, entering that 
in the first step to determine if it was significant by itself. This was done because of the 
wide age range of the participants and also because age is known to affect both ToM 
performance and performance on the independent variables such as language and social 
cognition.  Subsequently, based on the theoretical models of the relationship between 
ToM and the independent variables, additional variables were entered as appropriate to 
test each of the hypothesized models. Dependent variables (DVs) included the traditional 
ToM tasks and the Eyes test (when scores from this latter measure were available for all 
the participants included in the model being run).  
Model 1—Social Cognition as the Main Predictor of ToM 
Hypothesis 1:  Theory of Mind performance is related to measures of social cognition in 
children and adults with high-functioning autism. 
In this model, it was hypothesized that social cognition would make a unique 
contribution to ToM performance with indices of language and working memory 
explaining significant additional variance. In its most complete form, the social cognition 
measures (ADOS-SocCog, ADI-SocCog) were entered at step 1 with the language 
measure (Verbal IQ) at step 2, followed by a cognitive flexibility (Sample #1; Twenty 
Questions or MVCF) or working memory (Sample #2; WMS Digit Span, WMS Spatial 
Span, CMS 5-8 Numbers Backward, or CMS 9-16, Numbers Backward) score at step 3. 
With respect to hypothesis 1, the expectation was that all of the measures would be 
significant, with the greatest predictive power, or highest r-square, coming from the first 
set of social cognition variables, the next highest coming from the language variable, and 
finally, an additional increment coming from the executive functioning variables.  
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Model 1 with aggregated sample (DV = traditional ToM). With the aggregated 
sample using the traditional ToM measures as the DV, the ADOS-SocCog measure was 
entered at step 1 followed with the Verbal IQ (language) measure at step 2.  [Note: the 
second social cognition measure, ADI-SocCog was not entered in this version of the 
model because scores were not available for everyone in the aggregated set of 
participants.] No executive function variable was added in this version of the model as no 
common measures were available for the aggregated sample.  In this version of the model, 
general social cognition skills were not a significant predictor of ToM (p = 0.397). The 
language variable was a significant predictor of ToM a (p < 0.0001), uniquely explaining 
an additional 12.5% of the variance (adjusted R
2
 = 0.163). 
The aggregated sample was then sub-divided into adults and children to determine 
if the results were different by developmental group. Age was retained as a control 
variable given the wide range even within these sub-groups. For the adult participants (n 
=106), the social cognition variable was not a significant predictor of the ToM measure (p 
= 0.940). The language variable was significant (p < 0.0001), predicting an additional 
15.1% of the variance (adjusted R
2
 = 0.165).  
For the child participants (n = 166), the social cognition variable was a significant 
predictor of the ToM measure (p = 0.047) and predicted 5.8% of the variance (adjusted R
2
 
= 0.152). The language variable was also significant (p < 0.0001), predicting an additional 
12.7% of the variance (adjusted R
2
 = 0.279).  Table 1 provides a summary of results for 
Model 1 with the aggregated sample using the traditional tasks as the DV. 
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Table 1 
Model 1 with aggregated sample (DV = traditional ToM) 
 Entire Sample 
n = 272 
Adults 
n = 106 
Children 
n = 166 
IV ADOS- 
SocCog 
VIQ ADOS- 
SocCog 
VIQ ADOS- 
SocCog 
VIQ 
p-value 0.397 < 0.0001 0.940 < 0.0001 0.047 < 0.0001 
       R2 0.038 0.163 0.014 0.165 0.152 0.279 
Model 1 aggregated sample, with different ToM measure (DV = Eyes test). 
With the aggregated sample (n = 177) using Eyes test as the DV, the ADOS-SocCog 
measure was entered at step 1 followed with the VIQ (language) measure at step 2. In this 
version of the model, the social cognition variable was again not a significant predictor of 
ToM (p = 0.894). The language variable was again significant (p < 0.0001); however, with 
the Eyes test as the DV, language only explained an additional 5% of the variance 
(adjusted R
2
 = 0.286). 
For the adult participants (n =67), the social cognition variable was not a 
significant predictor (p = 0.177) for the ToM measure. The language variable was 
significant (p = 0.006), predicting an additional 9.1% of the variance (adjusted R
2
 = 
0.169).  
  For the child participants (n = 110), the social cognition variable was not a 
significant predictor of ToM as measured by the Eyes test (p = 0.521). However, the 
language variable was significant (p = 0.003), predicting an additional 5.6% of the 
variance (adjusted R
2 
= 0.278).  Table 2 provides a summary of results of Model 1 with 
the aggregated sample using the Eyes Test as the DV. 
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Table 2 
Model 1 with aggregated sample (DV = Eyes Test) 
 Entire Sample 
n = 177 
Adults 
n = 67 
Children 
n = 110 
IV ADOS- 
SocCog               VIQ 
ADOS- 
SocCog                VIQ 
ADOS- 
SocCog               VIQ 
p-value     0.894          < 0.0001     0.177             0.006    0.521              0.003 
       R2     0.236             0.286     0.078               0.169     0.222             0.278 
Model 1 with Sample #1 (CPEA)—Cognitive flexibility. Using only the 
participants from Sample #1 (CPEA) (n = 63), the social cognition variable was entered 
at step 1, followed by the language variable, and then the cognitive flexibility variable 
(Twenty Questions). In this version of Model 1, neither the social cognition variables (p = 
0.76, ADOS-SocCog; p = 0.882, ADI-SocCog) nor the cognitive flexibility measure (p = 
0.876) were significant predictors of ToM. As occurred earlier, when social cognition and 
language were entered without cognitive flexibility, the language variable was significant 
(p = 0.003) and added 14.5% to the variance (adjusted R
2
 = 0.112).  
This version of model 1 was not run using a subgroup of adults because of the 
limited number of participants with a cognitive flexibility measure (n = 23; 10 
participants required per IV entered into the model). When the model was run with only 
the children (n = 40), neither the social cognition variable (p = 0.654, ADOS-SocCog; p 
= 0.497, ADI-SocCog) nor the cognitive flexibility variable (p = 0.722) were significant 
predictors of ToM. However, the language variable had predictive power (p = 0.011), 
explaining an additional 15.5% (adjusted R
2
 = 0.124) of the variance. Table 3 provides a 
summary of the results for model 1 with Sample #1 using the traditional tasks as the DV. 
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Table 3 
Model 1 with Sample #1 (DV = Traditional ToM) 
 Entire Sample 
n = 63 
Children 
n = 40 
IV ADOS-     ADI- 
SocCog     SocCog       VIQ            CF 
ADOS-    ADI- 
SocCog    SocCog      VIQ          CF 
p-value   0.760      0.882            0.003         0.876   0.654        0.497       0.011       0.722 
       R2           -0.033                  0.112         0.096          -0.031                 0.124       0.102 
Model 1 with Sample #2 (ACE)--Working memory (DV = traditional ToM). 
Using only the participants from Sample #2 (ACE), the social cognition variable was 
entered at step 1, followed by the language variable, and then the working memory 
variable while using the traditional ToM measure as the DV. This version of model 1 was 
not run using the entire sample due to the fact that the children and adults were 
administered different working memory measures which did not allow this measure to be 
used as a consistent variable within the model. 
Within the subgroup of adults (n = 61), neither the social cognition variables (p = 
0.240, ADOS-SocCog; p = 0.859, ADI-SocCog) nor the working memory measures (p = 
0.174, Digit Span Backwards; p = 0.473, Spatial Span Backwards) were significant 
predictors of ToM. However, the language variable was significant (p = 0.014) and added 
14.6% (adjusted R
2
 = 0.222) to the variance.  
The working memory measure used for the subgroup of children was the CMS 9-
16 Numbers Backwards. The CMS 5-8 Numbers Backwards was not utilized as an IV 
due to limited participants with scores (n = 21; at least 10 participants per IV required). 
Within the subgroup of children (n = 66), neither the social cognition variables (p = 
0.307, ADOS-SocCog; p = 0.460, ADI-SocCog) nor the working memory measure (p = 
0.638) were significant predictors of ToM. The language variable was significant (p < 
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0.0001) and added 23.3% (adjusted R
2
 = 0.270) to the variance. Table 4 provides a 
summary of the results for model 1 with sample #1 using the traditional tasks as the DV. 
Table 4 
Model 1 with Sample #2 (DV = Traditional ToM) 
 Adults 
n = 61 
Children 
n = 66 
IV ADOS-    ADI-                       WM       WM 
SocCog    SocCog     VIQ      Digit      Spatial 
                                                 Span     Span 
 
ADOS-       ADI-                                
SocCog      SocCog         VIQ            CMS       
                                                        
p-value   0.240        0.859      0.014     0.174      0.473   0.307         0.460          < 0.0001       0.638 
       R2           0.076               0.222              0.246           0.037                      0.270          0.261 
Model 1 Sample #2 with different ToM measure (DV = Eyes test). Using only 
the participants from Sample #2 (ACE), the social cognition variable was entered at step 
1, followed by the language variable, and then the working memory variable while using 
ET as the DV. This version of model 1 was not run using the entire sample due to the fact 
that the children and adults were administered different working memory measures which 
did not allow this measure to be used as a consistent variable within the model. Within 
the subgroup of adults (n = 61), neither the social cognition variables (p = 0.189, ADOS-
SocCog; p = 0.638, ADI-SocCog) nor the working memory measures (p = 0.432, Digit 
Span Backwards; p = 0.714, Spatial Span Backwards) were significant. The language 
variable was significant (p = 0.025) and added 6.5% (adjusted R
2
 = 0.119) to the 
variance.  
The working memory measure used for the subgroup of children was the CMS 9-
16 Numbers Backwards. Again, the CMS 5-8 Numbers Backwards was not utilized as an 
IV due to limited participants with scores (n = 21; at least 10 participants per IV 
required). Therefore, the model was social cognition entered at step 1, language at step 2, 
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and working memory at step 3. Within the subgroup of children (n = 66), the social 
cognition variables demonstrated significance (p = 0.03, ADOS-SocCog; p = 0.023, ADI-
SocCog) explaining 7% (adjusted R
2
 = 14.2) of the variance. The language variable was 
significant (p = 0.007) and added 8.3% (adjusted R
2
 = 0.225) to the variance. The 
working memory variable demonstrated no predictive power (p = 0.584) for ToM ability. 
Table 5 provides a summary of the results for model 1 with sample #2 using the Eyes test 
as the DV. 
Table 5 
Model 1 with Sample #2 (DV = Eyes Test) 
 Adults 
n = 61 
Children 
n = 66 
IV ADOS-    ADI-                       WM       WM 
SocCog    SocCog     VIQ      Digit      Spatial 
                                                 Span     Span 
 
ADOS-    ADI-                                
SocCog    SocCog      VIQ      CMS       
                                                        
p-value   0.189      0.638        0.025      0.432      0.714   0.03        0.023        0.007       0.584 
       R2           0.054               0.119              0.097           0.142               0.225       0.216 
Model 1 conclusion. In the hypothesis for model 1, it was predicted that social 
cognition would explain most of the variance or have the most impact on ToM skills. 
Social cognition was revealed to be a significant factor only for the subgroup of children 
derived from the aggregated sample (DV = traditional ToM) and for the children in 
Sample #2 (DV = Eyes test) when entered with a model that included language and 
working memory. In both cases, social cognition only accounted for a relatively small 
percent of the variance (5.8% and 7%, respectively).  Although social cognition abilities 
may be more of a predictor for ToM in children than adults, it is not a primary factor. No 
executive functioning measures were revealed to be significant predictors of ToM ability 
in ASD for either the children or adults. 
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Based on the results obtained for model 1, language, which was entered into the 
model following social cognition, demonstrated the highest predictive power for ToM 
ability. It revealed to be a significant IV in every version of model 1 that was run, across 
the three different samples used (i.e. aggregated sample, sample #1, and sample #2), and 
across all groups of participants (i.e. entire sample, adult subgroup, children subgroup). 
In addition to exhibiting predictive power for outcomes on both ToM measures used as 
DVs, it also added additional explanation for the variances within each version of model 
1 that was run. This suggests that language has a substantial impact on ToM ability 
within the ASD population for both adults and children with this disorder.  
Model 2—Language as the Main Predictor of ToM 
Hypothesis 2: Theory of Mind performance is related to measures of language in 
children and adults with high-functioning autism. 
In this model, the hypothesis was that language would make a unique contribution 
to ToM performance with social cognition explaining significant additional variance. The 
language measure was entered at step 1 with the social cognition measure at step 2, 
followed by a cognitive flexibility (Sample #1) or working memory (Sample #2) score at 
step 3. With respect to hypothesis 2, the expectation was that all of the measures would be 
significant, with the greatest predictive power, or highest r-square, coming from the first 
set of language variables, the next highest coming from the social cognition measures, and 
finally, an additional increment coming from the executive functioning variables.  
Model 2 with aggregated sample (DV = traditional ToM).  Using the combined 
sample (272 participants) with the traditional ToM measure as the DV, the language 
variable was entered at step 1 with social cognition entered at step 2. No executive 
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function variable was added in this version of the model as no common measures were 
available for the aggregated sample. For this version of Model 2, the language variable 
was significant (p < .0001) and predicted 15.3% of the variance (adjusted R
2
 = 0.164). The 
social cognition variable demonstrated no predictive power for ToM ability (p = 0.397).  
When Model 2 was run for the subgroup of adult participants (n = 106), language 
was again significant (p < .0001) and predicted 17.5% of the variance (adjusted R
2
 = 
0.173). The social cognition variable demonstrated no predictive power for ToM ability 
(p = 0.940). 
When Model 2 was run for the subgroup of child participants (n = 166), language 
was significant (p < .0001) and predicted 25.6% of the variance (adjusted R
2
 = 0.265). 
The social cognition variable was also a significant predictor of ToM (p = 0.047); 
however, the additional variance predicted above that predicted by language was only 
1.4% (adjusted R
2
 = 0.279). Table 6 provides a summary of results for model 2 with the 
aggregated sample using the traditional tasks as the DV. 
Table 6 
Model 2 with aggregated sample (DV = Traditional ToM) 
 Entire Sample 
n = 272 
Adults 
n = 106 
Children 
n = 166 
IV                         ADOS- 
   VIQ             SocCog 
                        ADOS- 
   VIQ             SocCog 
                        ADOS- 
   VIQ             SocCog 
p-value < 0.0001           0.397 < 0.0001           0.940 < 0.0001           0.047 
       R
2
     0.164             0.163     0.173             0.165     0.265            0.279 
Model 2 aggregated sample, with different ToM measure (DV = Eyes test). 
Model 2 was then re-run using the combined sample (n = 177) with the Eyes test as the 
DV, entering language at step 1 and social cognition at step 2. For this version of Model 
2, the language variable was significant (p < .0001) and predicted 6% (adjusted R
2
 = 
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0.290) of the variance. The social cognition variable demonstrated no predictive power 
for ToM ability (p = 0.894). 
When this version of Model 2 was run using the subgroup of adults (n = 67), 
language was significant (p = 0.006) and predicted 17% of the variance (adjusted R
2
 = 
0.158). The social cognition variable demonstrated no predictive power (p = 0.177). 
When this version Model 2 was run using the subgroup of children (n = 110), 
language demonstrated significant predictive power (p = 0.003) and predicted 5.3% 
(adjusted R
2
 = 0.282) of the variance. The social cognition variable demonstrated no 
predictive power (p = 0.521). Table 7 provides a summary of results for model 2 with the 
aggregated sample using the Eyes Test as the DV.  
Table 7 
Model 2 with aggregated sample (DV = Eyes Test) 
 Entire Sample 
n = 177 
Adults 
n = 67 
Children 
n = 110 
IV                         ADOS- 
   VIQ             SocCog 
                        ADOS- 
   VIQ             SocCog 
                        ADOS- 
   VIQ             SocCog 
p-value < 0.0001           0.894    0.006              0.177    0.003             0.521 
       R
2
     0.290             0.286     0.158             0.169    0.282            0.278 
Model 2 with Sample #1 (CPEA)—Cognitive flexibility.  Model 2 was then re-
run with only participants from Sample #1 (n = 63), which allowed the cognitive 
flexibility variable (Twenty Questions) to be entered into the model at step 3 (DV = 
traditional ToM). The language variable demonstrated significance (p = 0.003) predicting 
14% (adjusted R
2
 = 0.139) of the variance. The social cognition variable did not 
demonstrate significance (p = 0.760, ADOS-SocCog; p = 0.882, ADI-SocCog). The 
cognitive flexibility variable did not exhibit predictive power (p = 0.876) for ToM ability. 
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Model 2 was not run with the subgroup of adult participants with the cognitive 
flexibility measure entered at step 3 because the sample size (n = 23) was too small 
(minimum number of cases needed per IV is 10). When Model 2 was run with the 
subgroup of child participants (n = 40), the language variable demonstrated significance (p 
= 0.011) predicting 14.9% (adjusted R
2
 = 0.158) of the variance.  The social cognition 
variable did not add predictive power (p = 0.654, ADOS-SocCog; p = 0.497, ADI-
SocCog) to ToM ability. The cognitive flexibility variable (Twenty Questions) did not 
reveal significance (p = 0.722) for ToM ability. Table 8 provides a summary of results for 
model 1 with sample #1 using the traditional tasks as the DV. 
Table 8 
Model 2 with Sample #1 (DV = Traditional ToM) 
 Entire Sample 
n = 63 
Children 
n = 40 
IV                 ADOS        ADI 
  VIQ      SocCog      SocCog         CF 
                 ADOS        ADI 
   VIQ      SocCog      SocCog         CF 
p-value 0.003         0.760          0.882         0.876   0.011      0.654           0.497         0.722 
       R2 0.139                   0.112                  0.096   0.158                 0.124                  0.102 
Model 2 with Sample #2 (ACE)—Working Memory (DV = traditional ToM). 
Model 2 was then re-run using only the participants in Sample #2, which allowed the 
working memory measure to be entered at step 3 (DV = traditional ToM). This version of 
model 2 was not run within the entire sample due to the fact that the children and adults 
were administered different working memory measures which did not allow this measure 
to be used as a consistent variable within the model. Within the subgroup of adults (n = 
61), the language variable was found to be significant (p = 0.014), predicting 30% 
(adjusted R
2
 = 0.228) of the variance. Neither the social cognition variable (p = 0.240, 
ADOS-SocCog; p = 0.859, ADI-SocCog) nor the working memory measure (p = 0.174, 
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Digit Span Backwards; p = 0.473, Spatial Span Backwards) appeared as a significant 
predictor of the ToM measure. 
This version of model 2 with working memory measures (CMS 9-16) entered at 
step 3 was then run with the subgroup of children (n = 66). The language variable 
demonstrated significance (p < .0001) and predicted 27.2% (adjusted R
2
 = 0.269) of the 
variance. Neither the social cognition variable (p = 0.307, ADOS-SocCog; p = 0.460, 
ADI-SocCog) nor the working memory measure (p = 0.638) exhibited predictive power 
for the ToM measure. Table 9 provides a summary of the results for model 2 with sample 
#2 using the traditional tasks as the DV. 
Table 9 
Model 2 with Sample #2 (DV = Traditional ToM) 
 Adults 
n = 61 
Children 
n = 66 
IV                 ADOS      ADI      WM        WM 
  VIQ     SocCog    SocCog  Digit       Spatial 
                                                Span      Span 
 
                ADOS       ADI 
 VIQ        SocCog    SocCog    CMS  
          
                                                        
p-value  0. 014     0.240       0.859       0.174      0.473 < 0.0001    0.307        0.460       0.638 
       R2  0.228              0.222                       0.246  0.269                 0.270               0.261 
Model 2, Sample #2, with different ToM measure (DV = Eyes test). Model 2 
(with language at step 1, social cognition at step 2,and working memory at step 3) was 
then re-run with a subgroup of participants (n = 156) using the Eyes test as the DV. 
Within the subgroup of adults (n = 61), language demonstrated significance (p = 0.025) 
and predicted 12.8% (adjusted R
2
 = 0.112) of the variance. Neither the social cognition 
measure (p = 0.189, ADOS-SocCog; p = 0.638, ADI-SocCog) nor the working memory 
measure (p = 0.432, WMS Digit Span; p = 0.714, WMS Spatial Span) added predictive 
power to the ToM measure.  
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This version of model 2 was re-run using the subgroup of children (n = 66) from 
Sample #2. Language was found to be significant (p = 0.007) and predicted 7.4% 
(adjusted R
2
 = 0.146) of the variance. Social cognition also exhibited predictive power (p 
= 0.03, ADOS-SocCog; p = 0.023, ADI-SocCog) and predicted an additional 7.9% 
(adjusted R2 = 0.225) of the variance. Working memory measures (CMS 9-16) were not 
a significant variable (p = 0.584) within the model. Table 10 provides a summary of 
results for model 2 with sample #2 using the Eyes Test as the DV. 
Table 10 
Model 2 with Sample #2 (DV = Eyes Test) 
 Adults 
n = 61 
Children 
n = 66 
IV                 ADOS      ADI      WM        WM 
   VIQ     SocCog    SocCog  Digit       Spatial 
                                                Span      Span 
 
                ADOS       ADI 
  VIQ       SocCog    SocCog    CMS  
          
                                                        
p-value   0. 025     0.189       0.638       0.432      0.714  0.007         0.03        0.023        0.584 
       R2   0.112             0.119                       0.097 0.146                   0.225              0.216 
Model 2 conclusion. Based on the results obtained for model 2, language, which 
was entered into the model at step 1, demonstrated the highest predictive power for ToM 
ability and uniquely explained 15.3% of the variance when adults and children were 
considered together in a model with social cognition as the additional IV. Language was 
revealed to be a significant IV in every version of model 2 that was run, across the three 
different samples used (i.e. aggregated sample, sample #1, and sample #2), and across all 
groups of participants (i.e. entire sample, adult subgroup, children subgroup).  In 
addition, language exhibited predictive power for outcomes on both ToM measures used 
as DVs; however, it uniquely explained the most variance for the traditional ToM 
measures. Language was the highest predictor of ToM in the language-social cognition 
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model that only included data from the children with the traditional ToM measure 
(25.6%).  
As discussed above, language also added additional explanation for the variances 
within each version of model 1 that was run. Therefore, whether language was entered 
first or second into the model, it continued to be a significant predictor of ToM. This 
provides further evidence that language has a substantial impact on ToM ability within 
the ASD population for both adults and children with this disorder.  
As seen in Model 1, for Model 2, social cognition was revealed to be a significant 
factor only for the subgroup of children derived from the aggregated sample (DV = 
traditional ToM) and for the children in Sample #2 (DV = Eyes test) when entered with a 
model that included language and working memory. Therefore, whether the social 
cognition measures were entered at step 1 or step 2, they added to the variance and 
exhibited predictive power for ToM for children. However, social cognition uniquely 
explained 1.4% and 7.9% of the variance, respectively, suggesting that it alone was not a 
strong predictor.  The consistency of results across the two models, suggests that children 
may rely more heavily on social cognition or that children require the use of more social 
cognitive resources when completing ToM tasks when compared to the adult population.  
No executive functioning measures were revealed to be significant predictors of ToM 
ability in ASD in Model 2 for either the aggregated group or the adult or child subgroups. 
Model 3— Executive Function as the Main Predictor of ToM 
Hypothesis 3: Theory of Mind performance is related to measures of working memory 
and cognitive flexibility in children and adults with high-functioning autism. 
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In this model, it was hypothesized that executive functioning (i.e. working 
memory and cognitive flexibility) would make a unique contribution to ToM performance 
with language explaining significant additional variance. The working memory measures 
(Sample #2) or cognitive flexibility measures (Sample #1) were added at step 1 with the 
language measure at step 2, followed by the social cognition measure at step 3. With 
respect to hypothesis 3, the expectation was that all of the measures would be significant, 
with the greatest predictive power, or highest r-square, coming from the first set of 
executive functioning variables, the next highest coming from the language variables, and 
finally, an additional increment coming from the social cognitive measures. It should be 
noted that no model with the aggregation of the two samples was run for Model 3 because 
there were no common cognitive flexibility or working memory measures available across 
both samples.  
Model 3 with Sample #1 (CPEA)—Cognitive flexibility. Using the participants 
from Sample #1 (n = 63), the cognitive flexibility variable (Twenty Questions) was 
entered at step 1, with the language variable at step 2, and the social cognition variables 
at step 3. The cognitive flexibility variable demonstrated no predictive power for the 
ToM measure (p = 0.876). The language measure was significant (p = 0.003), explaining 
an additional 13.5% of the variance (adjusted R
2
 = 0.125). The social cognition variable 
was not significant (p = 0.760, ADOS-SocCog; p = 0.882, ADI-SocCog).  
This version of model 3 was not run for a subgroup of adults due to limited 
cognitive flexibility measures within the adult subgroup (n = 23; at least 10 participants 
needed for each IV entered into the model). Within the subgroup of children (n = 40), 
cognitive flexibility did not add predictive power to the ToM measure (p = 0.722). The 
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language variable demonstrated significance (p = 0.011), explaining an additional 15.3% 
of the variance (adjusted R
2
 = 0.136). The social cognition variable did not exhibit 
predictive power (p = 0.654, ADOS-SocCog; p = 0.487, ADI-SocCog). Table 11 
provides a summary of the results for model 3 with sample #1 using the traditional tasks 
as the DV. 
Table 11 
Model 3 with Sample #1 (DV = Traditional ToM) 
 Entire Sample 
n = 63 
Children 
n = 40 
IV                                   ADOS        ADI 
  CF            VIQ       SocCog     SocCog  
                                  ADOS        ADI 
  CF            VIQ       SocCog     SocCog  
p-value 0.876        0.003          0.760         0.882 0.722        0.011          0.654         0.497 
       R2 -0.010       0.125                 0.096 -0.017       0.136                  0.102 
Model 3 with Sample #2 (ACE)---Working memory (DV = traditional ToM). 
Using the participants from Sample #2, the working memory variable(s) was entered at 
step 1, with the language variable at step 2, and the social cognition variables at step 3 
using the traditional ToM measure as the DV. This version of model 3 was not run within 
the entire sample due to the fact that the children and adults were administered different 
working memory measures which did not allow this measure to be used as a consistent 
variable within the model. Within the subgroup of adults (n = 61), neither the working 
memory variables (p = 0.174, Digit Span Backwards; p = 0.473, Spatial Span Backwards) 
nor the social cognition variables (p = 0.240, ADOS-SocCog; p = 859, ADI-SocCog) 
demonstrated predictive power for the ToM measure. The language measure was 
significant (p = 0.014), explaining an additional 12.2% of the variance (adjusted R
2 
= 
0.253).  
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This version of model 3 with working memory measures (CMS 9-16) entered at 
step 3 was then run with the subgroup of children (n = 66). Neither working memory (p = 
0.638) nor social cognition (p = 0.307, ADOS-SocCog; p = 0.460, ADI-SocCog) 
demonstrated significance within this model. The language variable was significant (p < 
0.0001), predicting an additional 27.6% of the variance (adjusted R
2
 = 0.260). Table 12 
provides a summary of results for model 3 with sample #2 using the traditional tasks as 
the DV. 
Table 12 
Model 3 with Sample #2 (DV = Traditional ToM) 
                   Adults 
                  n = 61 
          Children 
            n = 66 
IV WM         WM                       ADOS     ADI    
Digit        Spatial      VIQ     SocCog   SocCog 
Span        Span 
 
                               ADOS      ADI              
CMS         VIQ     SocCog    SocCog 
          
                                                        
p-value  0.174      0.473        0.014       0.240      0.859  0.638    < 0.0001     0.307         0.460 
      R2          0.131               0.253               0.246  -0.016     0.260                0.261 
Model 3 Sample #2 with different ToM measure (DV = Eyes test). Using the 
participants from Sample #2, the working memory variable(s) was entered at step 1, with 
the language variable at step 2, and the social cognition variables at step 3 using the Eyes 
test as the DV. This version of model 3 was not run within the entire sample due to the 
fact that the children and adults were administered different working memory measures 
which did not allow this measure to be used as a consistent variable within the model. 
Within the subgroup of adults (n = 61), neither the working memory variables (p = 0.432, 
Digit Span Backwards; p = 0.714, Spatial Span Backwards) nor the social cognition 
variables (p = 0.189, ADOS-SocCog; p = 0.638, ADI-SocCog) were significant 
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predictors for the ToM measure. The language measure was significant (p = 0.025), 
explaining an additional 12.3% of the variance (adjusted R
2
 = 0.098).  
This version of model 3 with working memory measures (CMS 9-16) entered at 
step 3 was then run with the subgroup of children (n = 66). Working memory (p = 0.584) 
did not appear to be a significant predictor of ToM ability. The language variable was 
significant ( p = 0.007), predicting an additional 7.9% of the variance (adjusted R
2
 = 
0.136). The social cognition variables (p = 0.03, ADOS-SocCog; p = 0.023, ADI-
SocCog) demonstrated significance within this model and predicted an additional 8% of 
the variance (adjusted R
2
 = 0.216). Table 13 provides a summary of results for model 3 
with sample #2 using the Eyes Test as the DV. 
Table 13 
Model 3 with Sample #2 (DV = Eyes Test) 
 Adults 
n = 61 
Children 
n = 66 
IV WM         WM                       ADOS    ADI    
Digit        Spatial      VIQ     SocCog   SocCog 
Span        Span 
 
                               ADOS      ADI           
CMS         VIQ     SocCog    SocCog 
          
                                                        
p-value  0.432      0.714        0.025       0.189      0.638  0.584      0.007        0.03          0.023 
      R
2
         -0.033              0.098              0.143  0.057      0.136                0.216 
  Model 3 conclusion. No executive functioning measures were revealed to be 
significant predictors of ToM ability in HFA. Once again, language, which was entered 
into the model at step 2, demonstrated the highest predictive power for ToM ability and 
uniquely explained additional variance.  These findings are consistent with model 1 and 
model 2, which also showed language to have significant predictive power for ToM 
ability. Therefore, whether language was entered first or second into the model, or 
whether it was entered following the social cognition measure or the executive 
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functioning measure, it continued to demonstrate significance and to account for the 
variance of the ToM measures. This provides further evidence that language skills have a 
substantial impact on ToM ability within the ASD population for both adults and children 
with this disorder. 
Social cognition, entered into the model at step 3, again exhibited significance 
only with a subgroup of children from Sample #2 when using the Eyes test as the DV. 
This was the same sample of children in which social cognition demonstrated predictive 
power for ToM within models 1 and 2. Therefore, whether social cognition was entered 
at step 1, step 2, or step 3, it was found to be a significant predictor when using the Eyes 
test as the DV for the children with ASD. This provides supplementary evidence that 
children may rely more heavily on social cognition or that children require the use of 
more social cognitive resources when completing ToM tasks when compared to the adult 
population. 
Discussion 
 The theory of mind (ToM) deficit in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) has been 
proposed to arise from an impairment in social cognition, to be related to the language 
problems that are characteristic of ASD, or to be related to a more general cognitive 
impairment in executive function, specifically in cognitive flexibility and/or working 
memory. The purpose of this study was to further explore the relationship of performance 
on measures of social cognition, language, cognitive flexibility, and working memory to 
the ToM deficit in high-functioning children and adults with ASD. Participants included 
two large samples of individuals with a diagnosis of ASD ranging in age from 5 to 55 
years. A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to assess the ability of social 
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cognition, language, cognitive flexibility, and working memory variables to predict 
measures of ToM. Three different models, related to the hypothesized relationships 
between these variables, were used to determine whether the independent variables were 
significantly related to the dependent variable of ToM and whether the independent 
variable uniquely added any predictive power to the model. In addition, the three models 
were run again using a second ToM measure, the Eyes test, which was not thought to be 
as heavily dependent on language abilities as the traditional measures of ToM.  
The model in which language was entered first had the highest predictive power 
for both the traditional ToM measures and ToM as measured by the Eyes test. Language 
also added significant predictive value in the other models in which social cognition and 
the measures of cognitive flexibility and working memory were entered first. Overall, 
language was the independent variable most highly predictive of ToM abilities.  
Further evidence for the critical impact of language skills on ToM is apparent in 
the fact that the language measure was a significant predictor across two different 
measures of ToM--traditional ToM tasks (i.e., Sally-Anne, Peter-Jane, & John-Mary) and 
the Eyes test. It could be assumed that language skills would play a larger role during 
completion of the traditional tasks than in the latter. In the traditional tasks, the examinee 
must comprehend an orally presented story and then respond verbally to questions about 
the story. The Eyes test has a lesser language demand, only requiring the examinee to 
choose 1 word out of 4 textually presented stimuli to describe an individual‘s feeling 
within a photo. The difference in language demand between the two measures is possibly 
reflected in the difference in the amount of variance explained by language for each of 
the variables, with language usually predicting the most variance for the traditional ToM 
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measures. Language appears to be imperative to comprehend that others possesses 
feelings and ideas of their own and to be able to describe or express this understanding. 
 A problem in the development of both language comprehension and expression is 
a classic diagnostic criterion for ASD (APA, 2000), and a wide range in the severity of 
these language deficits is observed across the ASD population. This language impairment 
may contribute to problems with social interaction not only by limiting the means by 
which individuals with ASD can communicate but also by being a significant factor in 
the difficulty these individuals have with perceiving and understanding the thoughts, 
ideas, desires, feelings, and beliefs of others.  Problems with language may be an 
essential underlying factor driving the impairments in ToM ability, resulting in a lack of 
appropriate social interaction, a hallmark characteristic of ASD. At minimum, the 
observed strength of the relationship between the language measures and the ToM 
measures in the current study would suggest a shared underlying factor that affects the 
performance of individuals with ASD in both areas. 
  The need for language to attribute thoughts to others is consistent with the 
observation that language is necessary to formulate one‘s own thoughts. According to the 
Cognitive Complexity and Control Theory – Revised (CCC-r) (Frye, Zelaro, & Burack, 
1998), individuals with typical development have the ability to shift between various 
perspectives within the brain. It is theorized that these perspectives are formed 
linguistically via silent self-directed speech (Farrant et al., 2012), requiring language to 
both formulate and comprehend this knowledge. Without language skills, no 
words/concepts to describe others‘ thoughts are available, leaving open the question as to 
how this process would otherwise occur. In typical development, this ability to think 
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silently about concepts and the perceptions of others is a skill which develops early in 
childhood, concurrent with the development of language skills (Leslie, 1987).  The ability 
to conceive of and project the thoughts and intentions of others is an implicit and 
essential process requiring little thought or effort on the part of ―normal‖ communicators 
as they use it to engage in socially appropriate interactions. 
The connection between language ability and ToM in children with ASD found in 
the current study is consistent with earlier work in this area.  For example, a direct and 
substantial correlation between an individual‘s verbal ability and verbal mental age 
(VMA) and ToM ability was also reported in a study with young children with and 
without ASD (Happé, 1995). The tasks used in that study to measure ToM included two 
false belief tasks; the Sally-Ann task, as used in the current study, and the Smarties task.  
One of the most interesting findings of the Happé study was the identification of a 
possible ―threshold‖ with regards to verbal ability and ToM. She found that all typically 
developing subjects with a VMA below 2.10 failed the ToM tasks, while all of those with 
a VMA above 6.9 passed. However, in the children with ASD, those with a VMA below 
5.6 failed the tasks, while those with a VMA above 11.7 passed all the ToM tasks. These 
results suggest that the children with ASD required a higher verbal ability when 
compared to typically developing individuals to complete ToM tasks and raise the 
question as to why this would occur. 
Is a higher VMA required because a higher level of language is needed to 
compensate for deficits in social reasoning or is a problem with language somehow 
interfering with development of social reasoning? In other words, language may be 
related to ToM in ASD because language is being used to ―bootstrap‖ or compensate for 
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the lack of the automatic or implicit process of ToM, or language may be related to ToM 
in ASD because the language processing demands are consuming cognitive resources that 
are needed for ToM processing, resulting in a lag in the development of this skill until 
language skills reach a critical point, freeing up cognitive resources. We will now review 
several recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies with individuals 
with ASD for evidence related to the relationship between linguistic and ToM processing.  
Language as necessary for expression of ToM 
An essential function of the human brain is to make sense of the world, including 
the actions of the other people around us, and the ability to translate experiences and 
impressions into language appears to play a central role in this sense-making process 
(Gazzaniga, 2000). Language allows our brain to generate ideas and create thoughts 
within our mind. Even when a task does not explicitly require the use of language, 
individuals with typical development appear to do so; however, this may not be as true of 
individuals with ASD as indicated by the results of a recent study with children with 
ASD. Carter, Williams, Minshew, & Lehman (2012) used fMRI to examine the 
neurofunctional mechanisms underlying behaviors of children with ASD when making 
social judgments. The children with ASD performed similarly to the children with typical 
development in terms of accuracy of their responses when distinguishing which of two 
pictorial vignettes depicted socially inappropriate behavior (a social reasoning condition) 
or which of two pictorial vignettes showed children who were outside (a physical 
decision condition). However, differences were observed in the patterns of brain 
activation during these tasks. The children with typical development had a stronger 
distinctive response during the social scenarios with increased activation in brain areas 
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related specifically to language and social reasoning (i.e. medial prefrontal cortex, left 
superior temporal lobe, bilateral inferior frontal gyrus at the pars triangularis, and the left 
inferior frontal gyrus/Broca‘s area). The children with ASD used primarily right inferior 
frontal gyrus and bilateral posterior superior temporal sulcus, areas associated with social 
reasoning. Based on the behavioral performance and brain activation pattern of the ASD 
group, a reduced subset of language and social areas of the brain was sufficient to 
accurately complete these simple tasks; however, the children with typical development 
appeared to be automatically encoding social reasoning/knowledge into language. The 
children with ASD did not appear to automatically encode their social understanding into 
language, a result consistent with reports of behavioral studies that children with ASD 
can recognize socially inappropriate behavior but have difficulty explaining why the 
behavior is inappropriate (Nah & Poon, 2010; Grant, Boucher, Riggs, & Grayson, 2005). 
Therefore, the results of this study suggest that the social reasoning of the children with 
ASD was adequate but was occurring with a lack of automatic encoding into language, 
suggesting an underlying impairment in linguistic processing which could interfere with 
the verbal expression of the ToM knowledge. 
The results from another fMRI study with children with ASD, suggests that the 
underlying problem is a failure to automatically engage ToM processing unless it is 
explicitly elicited in a task (Wang, Lee, Sigman, & Dapretto, 2006). In this fMRI study, 
children with and without ASD listened to short scenarios that were delivered with 
prosody that was manipulated to convey either a sincere or an ironic/sarcastic intent, with 
the latter condition expected to activate ToM regions in the brain. These investigators 
reported the children with ASD had greater activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus 
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and the bilateral temporal regions, a network associated with ToM processing. This result 
was interpreted as reflecting more effortful processing from the children with ASD to 
interpret the meaning of the ironic/sarcastic utterances. The investigators suggested that 
ToM processing was affected in ASD but could be engaged with increased effort.  An 
additional finding from this study was interpreted as supporting a compensatory 
relationship between language and ToM processing in ASD—the children with higher 
Verbal IQs were the ones most likely to have a greater activation in the right IFG and 
bilateral temporal areas. The investigators suggested that these children were using their 
―verbal reasoning skills in place of an ‗instinct‘ for interpreting the communicative intent 
of others‖ (p. 941). It is also plausible that these individuals with increased brain 
activation who also demonstrated increased language abilities may have learned more to 
compensate by using the RH to help increase language skills when the task required more 
language demands due to the limited language resources within the LH. 
Language as a competitor for processing resources 
Problems with linguistic processing and a related inefficiency in ToM were 
reported in another fMRI study with adults with ASD (Mason, Williams, Kana, Minshew, 
& Just, 2008).  In that study, adults with and without ASD read short discourse segments 
which required physical, emotional, or intentional inferences, with the use of a right 
hemisphere ToM network expected, especially in the third condition. In all three 
conditions, the participants with ASD displayed increased activation of the right 
hemisphere, specifically the right temporo-parietal junction (a prime region in the ToM 
processing network) when compared to the controls with typical development. However, 
even though the adults with ASD had brain activity above threshold in this region, they 
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had a decrement in behavioral performance, particularly in the third condition. This 
pattern of activation suggested that the ToM brain region was being used for more 
generalized linguistic processing and was not contributing to social reasoning per se.  
The theory behind the findings of Mason and colleagues (2008) is that the 
demand of the task assigned is more difficult in the ASD population and requires a 
processing load that the language-dominant left hemisphere cannot handle. Thus, these 
extreme processing demands consume the resources of the language areas in the left 
hemisphere of the brain, and require a spill-over to the right hemisphere to make sense of 
a task (Just, Carpenter, Keller, Eddy, & Thulborn, 1996; Just, Carpenter, & Varma, 1999; 
Prat et al., 2011). The left temporal lobe is responsible for language skills, specifically 
language comprehension; therefore, when this brain region can no longer increase 
processing in response to increase cognitive demands, the demand ―spills-over‖ to the 
right temporal lobe.  
Prat, Mason, & Just (2011) provided evidence for the ―spill-over‖ theory of 
language processing, using fMRI to examine neural differences during the reading of 
moderately and distantly related sentences by adults with typical development. The 
authors found decreased activation of the right hemisphere (RH) when the participant 
demonstrated increased language skill. Activation of the RH homologue of Broca‘s area 
(left IFG) and the individual‘s vocabulary size were negatively correlated, indicating that 
the RH required less activation if the participant demonstrated an increased semantic 
repertoire. Additionally, increased activation of the RH homologue of Wernicke‘s area 
(left PSTG) was apparent in individuals who were characterized as less skilled readers. 
The authors did not find any positive correlations between vocabulary size and RH 
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activation. Finally, the authors found reliable negative correlations between vocabulary 
size and activation of the Wernicke‘s area when attempting to comprehend passages 
which were considered less coherent, in that they did not include clause connectives, 
indicating that the individuals with lower semantic skills required increased activation of 
this area. These passages without the clause connectives, which provide an explicit cue 
for the inference to be made, would put an increased demand on the language system 
because rather than providing the language which would connect the clauses to make 
sense of the stimuli, the language system is required to reason and fill in the missing 
words and meanings in order to make sense of the task. The authors state that these 
results show that less-skilled readers exhibited less-efficient neural processing when 
reading, requiring more resources. They also observed increased activation of the RH 
homologues of LH language regions (Broca‘s area and Wernicke‘s area) used by the less-
skilled readers, and the authors theorize that this is due to limited neural resources within 
these language areas. Therefore, according to this ―spill-over‖ hypothesis, the RH is 
likely to be activated in certain situations due to greater amount of processing that the LH 
cannot handle.  The authors also state that role of RH in language may in fact be a result 
of the resource-drive allocation function. 
Based on the ―spill-over‖ model in which other regions of the brain are recruited 
secondary to processing overload, it can be hypothesized that individuals with ASD are 
recruiting different areas of the brain to compensate for impaired language abilities. 
Based on the results of Mason and colleagues (2008), the resources used for additional 
language processing may be those that could have been used for ToM or social reasoning 
instead.  If the language areas of the ASD brain do exhibit this processing threshold 
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resulting in the ―spill-over,‖ then the ASD population would experience an inefficiency 
in ToM and an increased difficulty encoding social situations into language. This could 
serve as one of the reasons as to why language skills are so highly correlated with ToM 
ability in HFA. 
Social cognition and ToM 
With regards to the relationship between social cognition and ToM, social 
cognition was not the most correlated independent variable. The social cognitive 
measures appeared to be a more significant predictor of ToM in the subgroups of children 
than the subgroups of adults; although, it should be noted that the amount of variance 
uniquely predicted by social cognition was generally small. However, this result suggests 
that, whereas, performance on the ToM tasks by the adults with ASD is primarily related 
to their language abilities rather than social cognition, the ToM tasks may be more related 
to more generalized social cognitive abilities in the children. The traditional ToM tasks 
were developed for use with children with typical development, and ToM has been 
considered to be highly related to the development of social cognition in that population. 
Perhaps the findings for the children indicate that there is a link between ToM and social 
cognition for the children with ASD also but that, over time, language becomes a more 
important variable for individuals in this population. The children in the current sample 
were 5 years of age and older, whereas the traditional ToM measures have been used 
most often with preschool-aged children. Therefore, the age of the children in the current 
study may have made it more difficult to observe the connection between social cognition 
and ToM.  
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Contribution of problems with language development  
There is the notion that humans are born with specific innate skills which allow us 
to easily tune into, learn from, and engage in our environment (Frith, 2001). Frith 
describes this as an innate ―start-up kit‖ (p. 970) which allows us to develop the ability to 
mentalize about others thoughts, perceptions, etc. through fast learning, and the 
perceptions of faces, voices, and movements of humans around us. These inherent skills 
allow our ToM ability to fully develop via exposure to socially influential stimuli 
throughout our environment. However, it is now generally accepted that ASD is a 
neurodevelopmental disorder (Frith, 2001) and that such inherent and neurological 
preferences such as specific attention for human faces, voices, and movements are most 
likely lacking across the ASD population. Klin (1991) found that preschool children with 
ASD did not show a preference for human speech over non-speech stimuli as would 
typically developing children. Hobson (1993) found that older children with ASD do not 
show a preference for facial expressions over salient objects presented as stimuli. Lastly, 
Schultz et al., (2000) studied brain activation patterns in adults with ASD and 
demonstrated that they did not distinguish between objects and human faces as normally 
developing adults did, indicating that even in adulthood, individuals with ASD still do 
not acquire these skills that typically developing individuals use from birth in order to 
develop a better understanding of the social environment around them.  
Some research indicates that maternal linguistic input is one of the factors 
contributing to the child‘s understanding that the mother has her own thoughts and 
perceptions. Farrant et al. (2012) found maternal linguistic input to be correlated with 
ToM skills. However, for this linguistic input to have a meaningful impact on the child, it 
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is assumed the child would need a preference for human voice as a pre-requisite in order 
to attend to it. For example, a child with ASD who might focus on the sound of rain or a 
wind chime over the voice of his/her mother would not benefit as a typically developing 
child would from the consistent mentalistic language provided from the mother. Although 
joint attention and attention to the mother‘s voice and facial expressions are essential, 
language skills are also vital for the understanding and application of the mother‘s 
linguistic input. Individuals with ASD may have difficulty comprehending or attaching 
meaning to the mother‘s language and therefore cannot use this input to create states of 
mind and apply these states to agents within the environment.  
Limitations 
 Limitations for this study included a lack of ability to directly select the 
assessments used to measure social cognition, language, working memory, and cognitive 
flexibility. These assessments had previously been administered and therefore appropriate 
measures for each independent variable had to be derived from the data that had already 
been collected. There was some limited sampling of behavior using the traditional ToM 
tasks/false belief tasks given that only three items were administered; however the Eyes 
Test included more sizeable behavioral samples and served to replicate or verify the 
results with a task requiring less language ability. Executive functioning measures were 
not entered into the models for the aggregated sample because these measures were not 
consistent between Sample #1 and Sample #2. Therefore only social cognition and 
language were able to be measured as predictors for ToM ability within this larger 
aggregated sample. The cognitive flexibility measure (Twenty Questions) was not a direct 
measure of perspective taking, the specific cognitive flexibility skill that has been argued 
 71 
to be related to ToM; this may have contributed to the lack of significance for this 
variable. Lastly, a strict definition of working memory was used; only specific subtests 
which required manipulation of information following verbal input were included. This 
difference in the measure of working memory may have contributed to findings that were 
inconsistent with previous research about the relationship between ToM and working 
memory. 
Conclusion 
 This study provides evidence for the strong relationship between language skills 
and ToM ability in adults and children with ASD.  General social cognition skills were 
less related to ToM abilities than language was, suggesting that individuals with ASD 
either depend on language to compensate for the lack of the development of ToM or 
cognitive resources needed for ToM processing are being devoted to language processing 
instead. Surprisingly, no relationship was seen between measures of cognitive flexibility 
and working memory and ToM. Although, these cognitive processes are thought to be 
essential for perspective taking and holding information on-line (in order to be able to 
think about the thoughts of others), no relationship with ToM was revealed in the current 
large sample of children and adults with ASD. Even though, the results of this study 
cannot determine what the nature of the relationship is between linguistic and ToM 
processing, they do provide support for current intervention efforts that use language 
skills to compensate for the lack of inherent ToM processing in individuals with ASD. 
Whether language is being used to compensate for a lack of automatic ToM processing or 
using cognitive resources needed for ToM, increased language skills appear to be the 
most promising route to increased ToM ability in ASD. 
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